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Abstract  
Enhancing the usability and availability of ICT systems and services essential for securing the 
vital functions of society signifies an advancement of the information society at all levels, from 
businesses and organisations to citizens, and in all security situations from normal conditions 
to disturbances and emergencies. 
 
The advancement of the information society increases productivity, competitiveness and social 
growth in all sectors, and increases the satisfaction of the individuals therein. Depending on 
the characteristics of the national economy, the information society represents an increase of 
nearly 40% in productivity. 
 
The information society is affected by different developmental factors, trends and related 
threat scenarios, such as the growing importance of international cooperation and business 
networking, the rapid growth and innovation in cybersecurity, and the growing role and 
importance of ICT in the face of new global phenomena, such as emission reduction (green 
ICT). 
 
The Internet has developed into a critical infrastructure. Internet components and services in 
Finland are an integral part of society. According to the working group, the Internet, as a 
neutral and critical networking platform, should be secured so that it provides sufficient and 
reliable services to the entire society. Different networks must be connected to form a single 
and adequately meshed communication infrastructure, thereby improving the reliability of 
services, especially in dispersed areas. 
 
The security and availability of vital data pools and information must be guaranteed. For 
example, in order to prevent data leaks and denials of service, data pools should be widely 
decentralised. Critical ICT systems should be arranged so that it is possible to influence their 
management through the use of national regulations and decisions. 
 
Society should promote protection interests in situations in which the market does not 
sufficiently encourage the private sector to invest in ICT protection to the level required by 
society. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Ba
ormation infra-
)1 is concerned 
s, from cor-
porations and organisations down to individuals and citizens, and in all security 
ergency con-
afeguarding the Security of Supply 
n. Critical infra-
, is essential for 
on the usabil-
g the vital func-
o present 
als and meas-
nvolved. 
With this in mind, the report defines a general operating framework for information 
nd which can be 
 can be used to 
 underlying 
ific critical ICT 
The report analyses at a general level the critical nature and current status of in-
ions, and considers 
egislation. It 
 for protecting critical infrastructure. 
of potential problem areas and vulnerabilities con-
astructure, and outlines possible solutions and pro-
n with other 
e public sector, 
quently sought to avoid duplication of effort. 
 
Development trends and threat scenarios 
 of develop-
ging. These can 
include the growing significance of international cooperation and networks, the 
rapid increase in cyber crime and its changing nature, and the role and importance 
of information infrastructure as new global phenomena emerge (e.g. emissions re-
duction/green ICT). 
 
                                                
 
ckground and aims 
 
The project entitled ‘Enhancing the usability and availability of inf
structure essential for securing the vital functions of society’ (YKÄ
with the wider adoption of information society technologies at all level
situations, from normal circumstances to disruptive situations and em
ditions.  
 
The Finnish Government Decision on S
(539/2008) identifies critical infrastructure and critical productio
structure is a system which, together with its constituent processes
producing or supplying a certain service or product.     
 
The aim of the YKÄ project has been to compile a clear status report 
ity and availability of information infrastructure essential for securin
tions of society at all levels in society and in all security situations, and t
solutions for the problem areas identified along with concrete propos
ures, including indications of the parties responsible and the costs i
 
infrastructure essential for securing the vital functions of society a
used for analysing critical information infrastructure. The framework
determine the ICT functions and components that are critical for the
structure of these vital functions, as well as industry and sector-spec
functions and components.  
 
formation infrastructure, also in relation to contingency preparat
whether usability and availability are supported sufficiently by the l
also looks at the adequacy of current measures
The report presents a number 
cerning critical information infr
posals for improvement.  
 
The YKÄ working group has conducted its work in close collaboratio
working groups charged with developing security projects within th
and has conse
 
Progress towards information society goals is affected by the nature
ments that take shape and by the trends and threat scenarios emer
 
1 The project entitled ‘Enhancing the usability and availability of information infrastructure essential for securing 
the vital functions of society’ is also referred to in this report by its Finnish acronym, YKÄ. The ‘information infra-
structure’ in the project name refers collectively to all information and communication technology (ICT) systems, 
services and networks.  
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The wider adoption of information society technologies will boost the p
and competitiveness of the national economy and growth and deve
segments of society, and will increase the satisfaction of the individu
formation society technologies have i
roductivity 
lopment in all 
als therein. In-
n fact accounted for as much as almost 40% 
of productivity growth, though the figure varies according to the particular charac-
ught by net-
ations to a mini-
nd thus to the 
t of value networks and lengthening of value chains, which exacerbates 
icipant can 
ommon strate-
ed by businesses and citizens rely on the 
-
ty of a major 
ion infrastructures critical to society is 10-20%. This could 
Cri e YKÄ work 
and
preparations 
able in all secu-
cenarios and se-
ls for business 
t in these areas. 
additional respon-
ive obligations 
 certain areas the role of public authorities is re-
any. The statu-
d to disrupt the op-
 Particular atten-
tion legislation and that of the European Un-
sectors and 
t in contin-
information infrastructures are in many cases global and are closely inter-
connected. They are also mutually dependent on other infrastructures, which 
means that their information security and resilience cannot be guaranteed on a 
purely national basis or without coordination. 
   
On 30 March 2009, the European Commission published a Communication laying out 
plans for immediate action to strengthen security and resilience in critical information 
infrastructures. Recent examples of the situations referred to in the Communication 
include the extensive cyber attacks in Estonia in 2007 and the cutting of undersea 
cables.  
teristics of the national economy in question.  
  
In businesses, the competitive pressures of the market economy bro
working appear to have reduced the level of contingency prepar
mum. Competition has also led to companies specialising further, a
enlargemen
the vulnerability of the system in a crisis situation. As no single part
alone achieve a significant benefit from contingency preparations, c
gies are needed. 
 
A key share of the services used and need
Internet, which has now become a critical infrastructure. In 2008, the World Eco
nomic Forum estimated that over the next 10 years the probabili
breakdown in informat
lead to costs of as much as EUR 170 billion globally. 
 
tical information infrastructure and the relationship between th
 contingency preparations 
 
The work under the YKÄ project has a direct impact on contingency 
because information society functions must remain usable and avail
rity situations. Contingency preparations mean analysing threat s
curing operations even in normal circumstances. 
 
For businesses, contingency preparations focus on the fundamenta
operation, agreements made with customers, and risk managemen
To the extent that this falls short of the needs of society at large, 
sibilities for contingency preparation are specified through legislat
and other special measures.  In
stricted to guidance, and the active role is given to a private comp
tory obligations for contingency preparation must not be allowe
eration of the market or distort equitable competitive conditions.
tion must be given to Finnish competi
ion.  Finland’s National Emergency Supply Organisation has different 
pools in which various companies and business organisations take par
gency planning on a contractual basis.  
 
Critical 
7 
 
 
Co
 
mportance. 
d issuance of 
e, protection and 
terms of usability and availability. Specifications, security classifications and 
is nevertheless 
nd telecommuni-
f administration, 
ty of in-
ectors do not, 
ms, such as 
those in the electronic communications field. 
nned, imple-
rocesses. Purely technical solutions 
d, ICT contingency preparations cover not only emergency conditions 
islation and 
king on contingency preparations between the public and private 
sectors functions well and there is an established practice regarding the distribu-
esses and citi-
nternet located in 
d and the Internet services available in Finland are an integral part of soci-
ety’s fabric today.   
 the globalisa-
ects of which 
e accessibility of ICT 
arios involving 
sure critical ICT 
 
 The market does not always encourage private operators to invest in the protec-
tion of critical information infrastructure to a standard required for society’s con-
tingency preparations.  This was also concluded by the European Commission.  
 
 The usability and availability of ICT services cannot be guaranteed in all 
cases, and this will affect society’s contingency preparations. An ICT company 
and a critical subcontractor company serving it could, for instance, dismiss a 
high proportion of their staff, discontinue certain services or even go bankrupt.  
 
nclusions 
The conclusions and measures set out below are not in order of i
 
 Finland’s telecommunications legislation, statute monitoring, an
standards regarding information society issues, and the structur
operation of networks and services, are of a good standard internationally in 
other standards are of a high quality.  Continuous development 
essential. 
 
 Ensuring the usability and availability of communications a
cations systems is, for the most part, in good shape in terms o
organisation, legislation and products/services.  
 
 There is room for further development in the usability and availabili
formation infrastructure.  The information system and service s
however, have comprehensive standards-based regulatory mechanis
 
 The usability and availability of information infrastructure is pla
mented and managed as part of business p
and standards are not sufficient. 
 
 In Finlan
but also disruptions under normal circumstances, through sectoral leg
with the aid of commercial service-level requirements. 
 
 The joint wor
tion of costs. 
 
 The Internet has become critical infrastructure. Services for busin
zens via the Internet have become vital. The elements of the I
Finlan
 
 A characteristic of recent developments in ICT services has been
tion of supply and the outsourcing of functions, possible side-eff
could cause serious market disruptions and problems with th
services. Globalisation, economic swings and future threat scen
networks have led to attempts to use national resources to en
functions. 
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 Today’s tough competitive environment leaves few spare resou
pany, and this could weaken its risk-bearing capacity and th
rces in a com-
us make the com-
tuation.  
dels have been 
nisation’s operating processes 
 making it more 
tworks include 
the entertain-
ervices. Control of these is based on different 
.  As a conse-
d services can 
be conflicting (quality classification, pricing). 
ion infrastruc-
nd 
ent essential for 
e mechanisms 
unding. Competition 
crease the alternatives, also in regard to usability and availability. 
ion body for criti-
 does not offer suf-
e for private operators to invest in protecting critical information in-
frastructure to a standard required for contingency preparations in society at 
l data transfer 
tion, regulation 
in an adequate 
vice structures at 
 are in harmony 
way in which 
other is the de-
 energy, tele-
uld be facilitated by exporting good 
 solutions from 
 
 Verification of information assets and data that are vital to society and accessi-
bility to these assets and data must be guaranteed in all security situations. In 
preventing information leaks and denial-of-service attacks, for example, it is 
good if information assets are widely dispersed. Managing information systems 
critical to the functioning of society must be arranged in such a way that it can 
be influenced through national legislation and decisions. 
 
 Enhancing usability and availability requires investment in strengthening exper-
tise and in training. Maintaining Finland’s critical information infrastructure and 
pany’s operations more vulnerable to various threats in a crisis si
 
 As a consequence of international cooperation, new operating mo
formed from complex value networks. An orga
may be partially or wholly located outside the country’s borders,
difficult to control the security and reliability of operations. 
 
 Besides conventional telecommunications, information society ne
communications traffic from various newer sources too, including 
ment industry and pay-to-access s
needs than that for ICT functions (e.g. filtering, obligation to store)
quence, the usability and availability requirements for networks an
 
 The report does not take a view on the ownership of critical informat
tures or their components.  
 
Measures 
 
 ICT business operations and markets, especially telecommunications networks a
services, should only be subject to guidance and control to the ext
ensuring diverse and sufficient markets and services. The guidanc
should consist of standards, operating licence conditions and f
will in
 
 Public sector involvement is important for establishing a protect
cal information infrastructure for situations in which the market
ficient incentiv
large.    
 
 The functioning of the Internet as a neutral, evolving and critica
platform must be secured with the aid of international collabora
and technical solutions, to ensure that it serves society at large 
and reliable manner. 
 
 Attention must be paid to ensuring that the development of ser
EU level and the measures to secure vital functions domestically
with each other and  mutually compatible. One example is the 
payment transactions have developed in the financial sector; an
velopment of shared structures among different operators (e.g.
communications).  Further development sho
solutions from Finland to the EU, in addition to Finland adopting
the EU.  
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drafting procurement and operating agreements of a high standa
strengthening of national expertise in normal circumstances. Im
of expertis
rd will require a 
proving the level 
e will also require additional investment in R&D projects in this field, 
both within the public sector and in owner organisations and organisations with 
and logistics is a 
in ensuring the vi-
tal functions of society in normal circumstances has also expanded and is of 
rganisation 
loped further and 
arding the shape this will take.  It also proposes that the 
rights to this preparatory work should lie with the National Emergency Supply 
 should also in-
llocated for fur-
d service-related 
f critical infor-
ith justifica-
 There must be a functioning, reliable, simple and sufficiently widely accepted 
identity recognition procedure in use within the information society. The working 
group proposes that identity management should form a separate concept in the 
field of critical infrastructure. To develop this concept, an investigation should be 
conducted into whether it can be linked up as part of some existing and suffi-
ciently broad identity management development project.  
 
   
 
 
 
responsibilities. 
 
 In maintaining the security of supply, the role of ICT activities 
strategic and growing one. The role of the information society 
growing significance. The role of the National Emergency Supply O
should be further strengthened and expanded in regard to ICT.  
 
 The working group feels it important that the YKÄ work be deve
preparations made reg
Organisation’s information society cluster. The preparatory work
clude R&D activities in YKÄ field. Sufficient resources must be a
ther developing the YKÄ work. 
 
 The working group has also set out a number of technology an
proposals for measures to improve the usability and availability o
mation infrastructure.  These are presented in the report, along w
tions (section 9). 
 
10 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1
information infra-
focuses on the 
ions, citizens) 
ons, namely normal circumstances, disruptive situations, 
al aims for it 
y the Ministry of 
ion underlying the YKÄ project is based on the principle that the 
ety technologies will have a positive impact on 
titiveness  
ity among citizens. 
ill be important 
in this, including 
orking 
ce of new global 
 from economic 
s, key roles are 
y (known by its 
ical infrastructures, and the implementation 
gramme objectives. Greater focus must be attached to con-
ons for threat scenarios concerning different programmes.  
 dealing with both 
ingly important. 
CT, and these go hand in 
1.1
The usability and availability of information infrastructure critical to society are de-
fined in the accompanying box2. In this report, usability and availability refer to 
ation society has become 
formation networks. 
 
Information security is also a key factor when considering usability, availability and 
accessibility. A good standard of information security means a situation in which 
threats concerning the reliability, integrity, usability and availability of data, sys-
tems, services and telecommunications do not pose a significant risk. 
 
                                                
 Information society goals and the YKÄ project 
 
The project entitled ‘Enhancing the usability and availability of 
structure essential for securing the vital functions of society’ (YKÄ) 
challenges in this area for society as a whole (businesses, organisat
and in all security situati
emergency conditions. The importance of the YKÄ work and the gener
are set out in the Ubiquitous Information Society Programme run b
Transport and Communications. 
 
The broader miss
wider adoption of information soci
the following in all sectors of society as a whole:  
 productivity in the national economy  
 compe
 growth and development in society, and 
 people’s comfort and convenience, and equal
  
The impact of different developments, trends and threat scenarios w
 the growing importance of international collaboration and netw
 rapid growth in cyber crime and a shift in its character 
 the role and importance of information infrastructure in the fa
phenomena (e.g. emissions reduction (green ICT), emergence
downturn). 
 
In terms of information society goals and gaining the trust of citizen
occupied by the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Societ
Finnish acronym, YETTS), society’s crit
of Internal Security Pro
tingency preparati
 
Making contingency preparations under normal circumstances for
disruptive situations and emergency conditions will become increas
Society is completely reliant on electrical power and on I
hand everywhere within the information society.  
 
.1 Usability and availability 
 
both convenience of use and accessibility. Today’s inform
completely dependent on the 24/7 operation of in
 
2 http://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Käytettävyys. (In Finnish, on usability and availability) 
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1.2  
option of information society technologies (Figure 1.1) wi  boost the 
productivity and competitiveness of the national economy and growth and devel-
 of the individu-
d for as much as 
g to the particu-
onal economy in question, such as total population and 
1.2
n society technologies can only occur if all the par-
ties involved feel that there is sufficiently well-founded tr  in the information so-
ublic sector 
organisation, businesses or citizens.  
 
The different aspects involved include safe Internet access, convenience and acces-
sibility of electronic services, consumer protection, legality of content, information 
security and the universal usability and availability (accessibility) of basic services.  
Improving the position of consumers requires a responsible approach from all con-
cerned, including consumers themselves. 
                                                
 
 
 Significance of information society technologies for productivity
 
Usab
The wider ad ll
opment in all segments of society, and will increase the satisfaction
als therein. Information society technologies have in fact accounte
almost 40% of productivity growth, though the figure varies cordin
lar characteristics of the nati
location in relation to markets and partners3. 
 
.1 Well-founded trust 
 
The wider adoption of informatio
ust
ciety and its services. Each party has its own perspective, whether a p
 
3 Eurostat, theme: Science and Technology/Information Society, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu. 
ility and availability are defined below.  
ed by specified 
on in a speci-
nsively users can 
rs to the level of resource use in achieving the 
es. Satisfaction refers to user satisfaction regarding use of the device or system, 
g and perform-
ance of technical systems. Another commonly used term for this is accessibility. Acces-
a proportion of the day the system is in operation and accessi-
hich means that it 
goal 
At the planning stage of online services the aim is to identify the parameters and re-
e purposes and terminal devices in question. Identifica-
bility into 
t than ’fixing’ an 
 
e service 
 lists of recom-
mended features for online services have been compiled, e.g. W3C’s checklist ’Web Con-
tent Accessibility Guidelines 1.0’. Such lists can also be used in evaluating the accessibil-
ility is difficult. 
   
 
Usability 
ISO 9241-11 defines usability as the extent to which a product can be us
users to achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency and satisfacti
fied context of use. Effectiveness refers to how accurately and comprehe
achieve their objectives. Efficiency refe
objectiv
the ease of interaction and the outcome. 
 
Availability 
In production environments, availability generally refers to the functionin
sibility refers to how great 
ble by users. For example, the accessibility of a system may be 99%, w
has been functioning 99% of the time. 
 
Accessibility as a planning 
quirements set by users and by th
tion of user needs could follow user-oriented planning principles. Taking accessi
account as early as the planning stage will guarantee a better end resul
existing service to make it accessible.  
Accessibility as a feature of th
Accessibility can also be seen as a feature of an online service. Various
ity of an online service.  
 
Accessibility and usability/availability 
Drawing a line between problems of usability/availability and of accessib
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curity
T
 
Figure 1.1 The wider adoption of information society technologies will boost the productivity 
omfortable and en-
1.2
 
peration of in-
ility and availabil-
intervening in 
g in CERT (Computer Emergency 
tion projects; 
tc. 
y requires the 
f 
is is especially important at the 
 functions and opera-
 of a process. This allows information security, for instance, to be 
treated as part of business processes. 
 
In surveying threats and risks, it should be possible to take realistic account of their 
probabilities and of the interrelationships of risks and threats. 
 
Finally, outlined solutions should focus on ensuring operating processes and on the 
most probable and most serious threats and risks, and should take a view on own-
ership, solution methodologies, resources and timetables. These are extremely 
challenging objectives. 
 
 
and competitiveness of the national economy, make people’s lives more c
joyable and improve equality among citizens. 
 
 
.2 Ensuring operations 
The prerequisites for trust are built on the following: ensuring the o
formation infrastructure critical to society (by guaranteeing usab
ity, at a high standard of service); information security measures; 
cases of harmful and unlawful content; investin
Response Team) activities; securing online banking; individual protec
making contingency preparations for cyber attacks and malware, e
 
Ensuring the operation of information infrastructure critical to societ
identification of processes, systems and their components, a realistic survey o
threats and risks, and the outlining of solutions. Th
infrastructure level where impacts are both deep and wide. 
 
In component identification it is important to note the individual
tors as elements
Society’s vital 
functions 
Securing YETTS/IT  
eration 
.g. usability/availability)
ded trust in the
(YETTS
/ICT
op
(e
Well-foun  
information society
ption of information 
    technologies 
More widespread ado
          society   
rends
Productivity increases
Competitiveness increases
Greater comfort, enjoyment  and equality
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1.3
ower distribution 
 operations, fuel 
ications and 
t of a 
ge due to a storm or technical fault. The implications of power outages 
of Defence publi-
Power distribution and telecommunications are in a critical symbiotic relationship 
ublication, section 24(1)(8-9) of the Act on the Open-
1.4
 Gartner estimated that the ICT industry produces two per 
on dioxide emissions.6,7 This is about the same as the avia-
an unsustainable situation, despite the envi-
 and even to 
1.4
The ICT sector has great potential to contribute to a reduction in emissions in those 
dioxide emis-
n by as much 
 is harnessed 
the emissions 
opean Union.  
sible for achievement of the energy 
rating the 
ciency in different 
tor and in other 
nology, such 
es, more intelligent 
-controlled transport and logistics, and electronic transactions and the wider 
adoption of information society technologies in other areas.  
 
It is essential to move towards a ‘ubiquitous information society’ in order to estab-
lish a framework in which ICT can be harnessed to improve energy efficiency and 
 of a high quality 
rowing telecommunications needs, thereby enhancing 
what the YKÄ project is 
 
 
                                                
 Society’s reliance on electricity 
 
Society is almost totally dependent on electricity. Disruptions in p
can paralyze everyday functions. Water distribution, wastewater
distribution, operation of shops, bank cash dispensers, telecommun
heating all rely on electricity. They would come to a standstill in the even
power outa
for society’s vital functions have been studied in a recent Ministry 
cation4. 
 
(see Appendix 15, not for p
ness of Government Activities). 
 
 Eco-efficient information society 
 
The research company
cent of the world’s carb
tion sector. Gartner believes this is 
ronmental benefits of ICT overall. ICT emissions are forecast to grow
double in the next few years. 
 
.1 Great potential for ICT sector  
 
sectors of society that produce the remaining 98 per cent of carbon 
sions. ICT technology could reduce Europe’s total energy consumptio
as 15 per cent by the year 2020.8 Estimates indicate that unless ICT
to improve energy efficiency, it will not even be possible to achieve 
and energy efficiency targets set for 2020 by the Council of the Eur
 
The ICT sector cannot of course alone be respon
efficiency targets, but it does have a uniquely important role in accele
type of structural change that would produce improved energy effi
areas of the economy. At stake is a structural change in the ICT sec
sectors towards better utilisation of the added value afforded by tech
as more efficient management of industrial and service process
ICT
thus to mitigate climate change. Network infrastructure should be
and should meet the rapidly g
trust in information society services. Advancing this is 
about. 
 
 
4 Long-duration power outages and securing vital functions of society, Ministry of Defence, 2009. (In Finnish) 
5 The appendices referred to in this report are classified. 
6 Gartner: ICT emissions match those of aviation, Digitoday, 27 April 2007. (In Finnish) 
7 http://www.vihreaict.fi/fi/fi_6.html. 
8 Towards an ecologically efficient information society, Minister of Communications Suvi Lindén, ICT and envi-
ronment seminar, 1 April 2009. 
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1.5 De velopment of in
 
formation society at international level 
1.5
ls are affected by 
rcumstances can 
 the national 
t-
ing functions by businesses, and on the information society at national level via the 
e critical infra-
rld Economic Fo-
isation’, the vul-
y:  
 Systematic financial risks give rise to financial risks throughout the entire fi-
educed eco-
stable, deep-
 
 
ple, at all times, 
itious food.10 As 
ing of a physi-
ls are an un-
erating structures 
sector organisations. Outsourcing, especially in pro-
ndamental force 
usi-
itive ad-
 more vulnerable 
onger de-
 Energy and the global risk: interconnected risks, separate incentives. Energy 
ergy supply and en-
all the time. In 
 economic and 
er geopolitical risks), current and future political decisions on energy will 
ape the entire global risk landscape. Incentives to reform the 
global energy economy in a way that would reduce global risks are not in evi-
Global risks are often interconnected in chains, especially in regard to energy 
rmation infrastructures. Where risks have become reality, the 
sed has normally been measured in financial terms or as loss 
of human life. 
  
1.5.2  Changing nature of crime  
 
Organised and serious crime, cyber crime and terrorism are all examined in 
Finland’s Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society (YETTS), and are be-
                                                
.1 Global risks 
 
The world economy and progress towards information society goa
various global trends, each with its own risk functions. Moreover, ci
change quickly, and risks with them. Global risks have an impact on
situation via the global economy and via factors such as the outsourcing of opera
Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society (YETTS) and th
structure (CI) and critical information infrastructure (CII).  
 
Current global trends of greatest importance, according to the Wo
rum9, include systematic financial risks, food security, ‘hyper-optim
nerability of distribution channels, and the role of energ
nancial system, which is seen in rapid asset depreciation and r
nomic activity. Financial systems in these circumstances are un
ening the crisis of confidence in the financial sector as a whole.
 Food security is defined as being a situation in which all peo
have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutr
with energy security, food security includes not only the satisfy
cal need but also the concept of economic access. 
 
 Hyper-optimisation and the vulnerability of distribution channe
seen global risk. Economic globalisation has altered the op
of both private and public 
duction but also increasingly in basic business services, is a fu
in global wealth creation, where limited global resources are allocated to b
nesses and territorial areas that produce the greatest relative compet
vantage. A more globally integrated economy is nevertheless
to distribution channel disruptions. Securing the economy is no l
pendent on its internal functioning. 
 
is a key factor in the global economy, but securing the en
suring its sustainable delivery are becoming more challenging 
the face of a long list of global risks (such as climate change,
oth
inevitably resh
dence, however.     
 
transmission and info
loss and damage cau
 
9 World Economic Forum, Global Risks 2008. 
10 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
15 
 
ing tackled for instance with the aid of the Internal Security Pro
tion networks and critical infrastructures allow the emergence of n
gramme. Informa-
ew forms of 
suring that this is an extensive theme and one affecting all areas.   
 
1.5
 crime is cyber 
which is cyber terrorism. In cyber terrorism terrorists 
for other ac-
tive procedures 
ture protec-
tion (September 2008). The problem is that protective procedures are fragmented, 
incompatible with each other and separated from business processes. In many 
cases, protective procedures have even led to new information security problems. 
 
crime, en
.2.1 Cyber crime 
 
One of the fastest spreading phenomena in the changing nature of
crime, a more serious side of 
use information networks (mainly the Internet) for their attacks and 
tivities supporting terrorism.  
 
Combating cyber crime has given rise to numerous different protec
and technologies. Figure 1.2 shows a Gartner hype cycle11 for infrastruc
 
 
Database Activity Monitoring IPS Intrusion Prevention System DAM 
S Distributed Denial of Service SIEM Security Information and Event ManagemeDDo nt 
HIPS Host-based Intrusion Prevention System SMB Server Message Block 
IDS Intrusion Detection System XML eXtensible Markup Language 
 
Figure 1.2 Hype cycle, infrastructure protection 2008 (Gartner).12 
 
 
1.5.3 Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) 
 
On 30 March 2009 the Commission of the European Communities issued a Communi-
cation on critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP)13,14. Politics will deter-
                                                 
11 Gartner’s hype cycle, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hype_cycle  
12 Gartner, 2008. 
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mine the plans for immediate action to strengthen the security and re
cal infrastructures. Recent examples include the series of cyber
silience of criti-
 attacks on Estonia in 
spring 2007, which brought banks, police stations and government offices to a 
.   
10 years the 
ity of a major breakdown in information infrastructures critical to society is 
ituation could lead to costs of as much as EUR 170 billion 
globally.  
1.5
rnet’s technical 
d financial ecosystem have grown so great that it is better to think of the entirety 
as being a complex system rather than just a machine. This system is not planned 
ns. A disrup-
e hard to pre-
Conventional risk management, i.e. focusing on identifying and eliminating hazards, 
 deal with prob-
 and continuity planning). In parallel with resilience, it would also be 
necessary to split up an overall problem into controllable functioning parts, and to 
1.6  threats in nor-
ces  
cause information 
ntingency 
rations under 
1.6
contingency 
entral and grow-
ing role in this integrated planning. Critical infrastructures, and through them soci-
ety’s vital functions, are dependent on ICT systems and on electrical power. 
 the Government 
im being that 
n different disruptive situations and emergency condi-
tegy for Securing 
(YETTS), which is used to mesh together the contin-
                                                                                                                                                          
standstill for a week, and the cutting of undersea cables in 2008
 
The World Economic Forum estimated in 2008 that over the next 
probabil
10-20%. A disruptive s
15
 
.4 Unpredictable ICT ecosystem16 
 
The number of components and their interdependencies in the Inte
an
but is instead the outcome of its component parts and their interactio
tion in one part of the system can lead to changes elsewhere that ar
dict.  
 
is no longer applicable. Contingency preparations must be made to
lems (resilience
operate within these (“new sustainable economy”).17 
 
 Role of contingency preparations: preventing realisation of
mal circumstan
  
 
The YKÄ work is directly related to contingency preparations, be
society functions must remain available in all security situations. Co
preparations mean analysing the threat scenarios and ensuring ope
normal circumstances. 
 
.1 Integrated contingency preparation system 
 
Finland has a contingency preparation system based on integrated 
planning and on stockpiling critical production inputs. ICT plays a c
 
Contingency preparations are directed by the Government and via
Decision on Safeguarding the Security of Supply (539/2008), the a
Finns should be able to cope i
tions affecting society. In 2006, the Government approved a Stra
the Functions Vital to Society 
 
13 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/nis/strategy/activities/ciip/index_en.htm 
14 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection – ”Protect-
ing Europe from large scale cyber attacks and disruptions: enhancing preparedness, security and resilience”, 
Brussels 30 March 2009, COM/2009/0149 final. 
15 Global Risks 2008. 
16 Prof. Heikki Hämmäinen, Ensuring operation of information networks, Tiedosta journal, Finnish Information 
Society Development Centre, 9 March 2009. (In Finnish) 
17 Leppävuori, 2008. 
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gency preparations of the different administrative branches of government. Each 
 
iples, agree-
ade with customers, and risk management of their operations. The finan-
preparations for 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have an important role in enhancing secu-
ciety’s resilience in 
the face of a crisis.  
1.6 stances 
tingency preparations it is not possible to foresee and 
prevent all threats. Unexpected and sudden events that also require leadership and 
 arrangements are known as special situations. 
tive situations or 
1.6
 networks and their 
general level of preparedness. The Government security services unit puts together 
a national situation report using information from different ministries and other 
sp rganisations. Public networks et, mobile, corporate networks, 
ot e very important in the assemb  daily situation report. The YKÄ work 
ha ey role in this in developing the bility of critical ICT services.  
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
Figure 1.3 Government telecommunications networks. 
 
1.7 Aims of report  
 
The aim of the YKÄ project has been to obtain a picture of the usability and avail-
ability of information infrastructure essential for securing the vital functions of soci-
ety at all levels in society (central government, public administration, information 
ministry controls and monitors its own contingency preparations. 
 
Contingency preparations by businesses are based on business princ
ments m
cial sector also has obligations set out by law to make contingency 
disruptions. 
 
rity at a practical level. Through their work they also add to so
 
.2 Contingency preparations against threats are made in normal circum
 
Even with large-scale con
information provision beyond normal
A special situation can arise during normal circumstances, disrup
emergency conditions. 
 
.3 Situation report assembled via public networks 
 
Figure 1.3 shows Finland’s public sector telecommunications
ecified o  (Intern
her) ar ly of a
s a k  availa
Government’s joint, 
secure te
munications solution
lecom-TUVE security
network 
Defence Forces 
network 
Finnish Defence Forces 
Public 
 
 
internet
netwo
such as the
rks
Situation report: Crisis management telecoms
Situation report: Daily telecoms 
Authorities responsible for
 security: 30,000-40,000 people  
Other govt. sector: 
60,000 people
Higher level of 
con
pre
Higher 
ower level oL f
contingency
preparation
Lower
costs
tingency
paration
costs
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society in general) and in all security situations (normal circumstances
situations, emergency conditions). Solutions have also been sought
, disruptive 
 for the problem 
situations identified, along with concrete proposals and measures, including indica-
rties responsible and the cost implications. 
 
1.7
mework for in-
f society and 
ation infrastructure. The framework 
can be used to determine the ICT functions and components that are critical to the 
t status of in-
 to contingency preparations, and considers 
ion. The 
th other working 
sector, and has 
rrent measures for protecting critical in-
ber of specific potential problem areas and 
lines possible 
le of energy 
s areas in this.  
1.7
The threats affecting vital functions and the usability and availability of information 
astructure pro-
), at both the 
business processes 
ructures in all critical infrastructures. CIIP aims at securing and optimising 
ailability of business processes and structures in critical infor-
mation infrastructure. 
nd CIIP needs to 
 to the usability 
 systems, and in regard to 
1.7
ility and availability of 
information infrastructure essential for securing the vital functions of society (the 
YKÄ project) are specified in the Ubiquitous Information Society Programme 
run by the Ministry of Transport and Communications.  
 
The YKÄ project has many different dimensions. The work of the project touches on 
a number of different public sector strategies, programmes and projects (Figure 
1.4). Participation in the EU’s CIP and CIIP work, and influencing the course of this 
work, is also an important element of the YKÄ project. New information society 
phenomena, such as online communities, are also taken into account. 
 
tions of the pa
.1 Analysis framework 
 
With these aims in mind, this report defines a general operating fra
formation infrastructure essential for securing the vital functions o
which can be used for analysing critical inform
underlying structure of vital functions, as well as the industry- and sector-specific 
critical ICT functions and components that overlay this.  
 
The report analyses at a general level the critical nature and curren
formation infrastructure, also in relation
whether usability and availability are supported sufficiently by the legislat
YKÄ working group has conducted its work in close collaboration wi
groups charged with developing security projects within the public 
consequently sought to avoid duplication of effort. 
 
The report also looks at the adequacy of cu
frastructure. The report presents a num
vulnerabilities concerning critical information infrastructure, and out
solutions and proposals for improvement. This also concerns the ro
supply for telecommunications networks and the potential problem
 
.2 Usability and availability of critical infrastructures 
 
infrastructure are examined from two main perspectives, critical infr
tection (CIP) and critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP
process and structural levels. CIP aims at securing continuity in 
and st
the usability and av
 
The analysis framework established in the report allows both CIP a
be examined at a general level and the impacts analysed in regard
and availability of society’s critical ICT functions and
business. 
 
.3 YKÄ project in context 
 
The importance and general aims of enhancing the usab
19 
 
Occupying a key role in the activities covered by the YKÄ project
tor and the users of its services (public admin
 is the private sec-
istration, businesses, citizens), to-
vernment’s 
me. Both the 
m the perspec-
pri-
vate sector operators. In the implementation of the Internal Security Programme, 
trust in information society services, accessibility of these services, and their usabil-
ity and availability are of  importance.    
 
 
 
Figure 1.4 The YKÄ project and its wider context. 
 
primar
gether with their agreements and development projects. 
 
The YKÄ work has a close relationship with the VARE project on the go
ICT contingency preparations and with the Internal Security Program
YKÄ and VARE projects look at the same challenges and threats, fro
tives of service providers and users. The service providers are mainly the same 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y
Other strategies, programmes, projects, agreements
-
YKÄ Project
Ubiquitous Information
Society Programme
Internal Security
Programme (STO)
Report on Security and
Defence Policy 2009
Strategy for Securing the
Functions Vital to
Society (YETTS)
Development project on
government´s ICT contingency
preparations (VARE)
Operational continuity
management (SOPIVA)
Government´s joint
secure telecommunications
solution
eServices and eDemocracy
Acceleration Programme
(SADe)
Telecommunications network
security and security of supply
(TELVE)
Security network project for
the  government sector
(TUVE)
National Information
Security Strategy
National strategy for
research on security
Developing the legislation
on ICT contingency
preparations
 and public sector
• International dimension (e.g. EU CIP and CIIP, Nato, OECD)
• Cyber security, cyber crime
• Online communities (Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, LinkedIn, Google, ...)
• Service providers, businesses
• Regional and local government
• Civic services
• Information society legislation and standards 
• Other information society projects of ministries
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2 OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
2.1
specifies the fol-
ital to society: management of government af-
fairs; international activity; national military defence; internal security; functioning 
nomy and infrastructure; the population’s income security and capability 
 the security of supply in Finland cover seven critical sectors 
ciety  
supply  
 finance services  
 
 are composed of structures and functions that are es-
sential for the uninterrupted functioning of society. Critical infrastructures include 
s and services. 
ndividual critical 
on of the entire entity.  
 
2.1
ral part of the in-
uts and contin-
l functions are reli-
ortance of ICT in critical sectors is examined briefly in Appendix 1 in the 
light of a number of market and volume indicators. 
 
 the security of 
supply both involve very close partnership between the public and private sectors. 
At the government level there are approximately 2,000 critical businesses, and 
ip with the private sector 
the National Emergency Supply Agency.  
 
2.1.4  YKÄ project 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between the YKÄ project (‘Enhancing the usability 
and availability of information infrastructure essential for securing the vital func-
                                                
2.1 General situation
 
.1 Society’s vital functions 
 
The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society (YETTS)18 
lowing seven (7) functions as being v
of the eco
to function; and psychological crisis tolerance.  
 
2.1.2 Critical sectors 
 
Activities for ensuring
) 19: (infrastructures
 information so
 energy 
 transport and logistics  
 health services  
 critical industry and  
 food supply.  
These critical infrastructures
both physical establishments and structures and electronic function
Securing these infrastructures means identifying and securing the i
points while also constantly ensuring the operati
.3 Integrated contingency preparations 
 
Finland has a contingency preparation system that forms an integ
formation society and is based on stockpiling critical production inp
gency planning. All critical infrastructures and thus society’s vita
ant on ICT systems and on electrical power supply.  
 
The imp
Securing society’s vital functions and maintaining and developing
these have a great many network partners. The partnersh
is coordinated by 
 
18 Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society, government resolution, 23 November 2006. 
19 http://www.huoltovarmuus.fi/.  
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tions of society’) and YETTS (the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Soci-
ty’.  
 sector) and 
 of businesses and 
citizens in an advanced information society. The YKÄ project also covers all security 
situations (normal circumstances, disruptive situations, emergency conditions).  
 
ety), as well as critical sectors in the ‘ubiquitous information socie
 
The YKÄ work extends across all administrative branches (in the ICT
covers the full spectrum from central government needs to those
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YETTS 
Normal circumstances
Disruptive situations
Emergency conditions
YKÄ
Crit
ical
Ubiquitous information
society
(citizens, public & 
private sectors)
Public admin.
(municipalities,
parishes, 
govt.) 
Govt. 
infr
as
ctu
res
YETTS
tru
Critical sectors YKÄ 
 Management of government 
International activity 
 National military defence 
 Internal security 
security and capability to 
function 
 Energy supply
 ICT system
 Food supp
 Health service
 Banking and f ices 
despread adoption of 
ormation society technolo-
gies 
nded trust 
(Usability, availability, ac-
 
vel, information 
security, ...) 
 Ensuring ICT operation 
 Critical information infra-
e (ICT/CI) 
 Time span 
 Role in contingency prepara-
affairs 
 
 
s 
 More wi
inf
ly 
s 
inancial serv
 Well-fou
 Functioning of the economy 
and infrastructure 
 The population’s income 
 Transport and logistics 
 Critical industry 
cessibility,
service le
 Psychological crisis toler-
ance 
 
structur
tions 
 
Figure 2.1 Role of the YKÄ project in relation to the Strategy for Securing the 
tal to Society (YETTS) and critical sectors in the ‘ubiquitous information
 
Functions Vi-
 society’. 
 
2.2 Public sector guidance mechanisms, programmes and projects relevant to 
the YKÄ project 
 
Due to the multifaceted nature of the YKÄ project, reference is made to it and 
frameworks created for it in many public sector organisations, programmes and 
projects, ranging from the Government Report on Security and Defence Policy to in-
formation security strategies for the government and for citizens, and ICT stan-
dards. 
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2.2.1
 Government 
ing li-
and agreements and other obligations. The obligation 
cy conditions is 
ate institutions 
ed by public law, other state authorities, state-owned enterprises, munici-
palities, joint municipal authorities and other groupings of municipalities all have an 
 in different 
Some of the strategies, such as the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to So-
s guidance for public administration. YETTS was not 
ncial and invest-
  
mes and pro-
 is listed first because it es-
KÄ project.  
ramme 
ADe) 
ciety (YETTS) 
ent ICT contingency preparations (VARE) 
 Operational continuity management (SOPIVA) 
cations network security and security of supply (TELVE) 
ector (TUVE) 
 
ional strategy for research on security. 
. 
munications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) 
ent IT Shared Service Centre 
 National Emergency Supply Organisation (incl. the National Emergency Supply 
Agency) 
 Government Information Security Management Board (VAHTI) 
 Advisory Committee for Data Administration in Public Administration (JUHTA) 
 Organisations with administrative responsibilities in this field (e.g. Financial 
Supervisory Authority) 
 Ownership steering bodies (Ministry of Finance’s ownership steering unit, 
named Solidium) 
 Private sector. 
 
 
 
 Public sector guidance mechanisms 
 
Public sector strategies, programmes and projects are guided by the
Programme, legislation and legal praxis, standards and guidelines, operat
cences, technical instructions 
of public authorities to make contingency preparations for emergen
set out in the Emergency Powers Act.  
 
The Government, state administrative authorities, independent st
govern
obligation to verify that their duties are managed as well as possible
situations. 
 
ciety (YETTS), serve mainly a
designed with the private sector in mind and does not include fina
ment decisions or profit expectations. It also lacks guidance tools.
 
2.2.2 Strategies, programmes and projects 
 
The YKÄ project takes into account the following strategies, program
n Society Programmejects. The Ubiquitous Informatio
tablishes the needs and framework for the work covered by the Y
 Ubiquitous Information Society Prog
 eServices and eDemocracy Acceleration Programme (S
 National Information Security Strategy 
 Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to So
 Internal Security Programme (STO) 
 Development project on governm
 Telecommuni
 Government’s joint secure telecommunications solution 
t s Security network project for the governmen
ity and Defence Policy 2009  Government Report on Secur
 Developing the legislation on ICT contingency preparations 
 Nat
 
2.2.3 Organisations responsible  
 
The work covered by the YKÄ project is being carried out by e.g
 Finnish Com
 Governm
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2.2.4
d to other or-
ganisations, the statutory responsibilities designated to the different ministries con-
cerning the YKÄ work remain intact. These responsibilities are set out in Appendix 
rammes and 
ach case. The guidance 
mechanisms are presented in more detail under each strategy or project. Appendix 
D activities in the YKÄ field, international CII 
2.3
ory of protecting its critical infrastructures and also has suc-
cessful partnership models for this. This has allowed it to play an active role in the 
collaboration set up by the European Union concerning critical infrastructure protec-
the measures out-
2.3
ed and desig-
ted in a Green 
ean Communi-
 and services. 
 their weaknesses, 
on, EU-wide 
on programmes 
ould also bring added value to 
them. 
This would also reinforce the ability of the EU’s internal market to safeguard the 
profitability of business activities and create wealth on a continuous basis. 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates a commonly presented view of the different ECIs. As ICT sys-
tems are strategic components that form an integral part of the other critical infra-
structures, the author has sought to illustrate this in the figure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 
Critical infrastructures specified 
by the European Union.  
 Ministries 
 
Even where responsibilities regarding implementation are delegate
2. 
 
Appendix 2 contains a more extensive summary of strategies, prog
projects together with the organisations responsible in e
3 contains a summary of national R&
and CIIP projects and the standards and requirements in the sector.  
 
 Protecting Europe’s critical infrastructures 
 
Finland has a long hist
tion. Finland has already gone a long way towards implementing 
lined in the EU’s programme. 
 
.1 ECI 
 
Critical infrastructures with cross-border impacts have been identifi
nated as European critical infrastructures (ECIs). These ECIs were lis
Paper (November 2005) presented by the Commission of the Europ
ties, and are shown in Appendix 2 with their associated products
 
Since the ECIs extend across national boundaries, any survey of
vulnerabilities and security deficiencies should be based on a comm
methodology that would not only complement the national protecti
already being implemented in Member States but w
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2.3
n specified by the 
 and navigation 
ng systems. The ‘layers’ within the ICT 
ment, energy, hardware, software, networks, content, poli-
s and added value services.  
2.3
ormation infra-
IIP policy ini-
tiative is being implemented as part of the broader European Programme for Critical 
PCIP is being man-
 Security20. The 
on can be im-
roviding support for this. Means of protection are needed espe-
cially in combating terrorism, but also for other reasons such as natural and techno-
al disasters. In EU terminology, critical infrastructures are systems critical to so-
 states and whose 
angements and 
 
2.3
 designation of 
 the Critical Infrastruc-
ture Warning Information Network (CIWIN) 23. 
rotection repre-
ive concentrates 
r three years, 
de the ICT sector in the next, revised directive. 
 
2.4 International cyber initiatives 
 
International cyber attacks against critical infrastructures in different parts of the 
world occur almost weekly and have given rise to a number of cyber initiatives. In 
fence Centre of Excellence in Es-
es have emerged at different levels, too (e.g. 
ret Cyber Initiative, USA ).  
                                                
.2 ECI/ICT 
 
ICT subsectors that are critical in an information society have bee
EU as follows: the Internet, fixed networks, mobile networks, radio
systems, satellite systems and broadcasti
subsectors are: environ
cies and practices, user
 
.3 CIIP policy initiative and EPCIP 
 
In 2008 the European Union approved a policy initiative on critical inf
structure protection (CIIP), which had long been in preparation. This C
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) and also in parallel with it. The E
aged directly from the Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and
Council of the European Union adopted the EPCIP in April 2007. 
 
The EPCIP is examining ways in which critical infrastructure protecti
proved and is also p
logic
ciety that have an operating impact covering at least two European
efficient protection requires common and coordinated protection arr
cross-border collaboration. 
.4 Directive 
 
A key element of the EPCIP is the Directive on the identification and
ECIs, issued in December 200821,22. A further key element is
 
Directive 2008/114/EC on the Identification and Designation of European Critical 
Infrastructures and the Assessment of the Need to Improve their P
sents the first step towards defining and assessing ECIs. The Direct
initially on the energy and transport sectors. It will be reviewed afte
and the intention is to inclu
spring 2008, NATO set up a Cooperative Cyber De
tonia24. Numerous other cyber initiativ
25the sec
 
20 http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/2004_2007/epcip/funding_epcip_en.htm. 
21Directive 2008/114/EC. 
22http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/fi/08/st16/st16862.fi08.pdf. 
23COM(2008) 676 final. 
24 Helsingin Sanomat, 11 June 2008. 
25 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/25/AR2008012503261.html. 
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3 VITAL FUNCTIONS OF SOCIETY AND THREAT SCENARIOS 
 
3.1
r securing soci-
hich are sub-
s allows the 
Government and Parliament the opportunity to conduct a regular, wide-ranging and 
ts in the secu-
basis. 
The vital functions are sets of functions essential to society that run across the dif-
f anches of government and whose continuity must be se-
re 3.1).  
 functioning of the economy and infra-
 the population’s income security and ca-
pability to function 
  Functions 
 
The Finnish Government puts forward necessary policy guidelines fo
ety’s vital functions26 in its reports on security and defence policy, w
mitted to Parliament for approval. The practice of issuing these report
thorough debate on security issues. The reports assess developmen
rity environment and determine Finland’s operating strategy on this 
 
erent administrative br
cured at every moment (see Figu
 
 
Society’s vital functions are: 
 management of government affairs 
 international activity 
 national military defence 
 internal security 
structure 
 psychological crisis tolerance. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Society’s vital functions are secured by focusing on strategic tas
 
Vital
function
Strategic
stask
ks. 
 
s outlined that sets the basis for defining the stra-
t states and 
 account 
nited Nations, its 
ship for Peace and in other international forums. 
3.2
The security situations regarding society’s vital functions and the various threats 
and threat scenarios affecting these are for the most part the same whether dealing 
with the public sector, the private sector or citizens in general. Differences are con-
cerned mainly with whether the situation is in normal or emergency conditions or 
related to crisis management.  
The YKÄ project deals with securing the usability and availability of information in-
frastructures and their energy supply in all circumstances.  
 
                                                
For each function, a target state i
tegic tasks for which the ministries are responsible and the related maintenance 
and development tasks. The descriptions of functions and their targe
the development required for managing the strategic tasks take into
Finland’s membership of the European Union, its work within the U
work in NATO’s Partner
 
 Security situations and threat scenarios 
 
 
 
26 Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society, government resolution, 23 November 2006. 
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3.2
s. Contingency 
d taking meas-
unications, 
 and for con-
ons must be protected and secured during normal circumstances, 
e situations and 
ces’, ‘disruptive 
an occur in any of 
these (Figure 3.2). The usability and availability of information infrastructure essen-
tial for society’s vital functions are matters that concern all security situations, and 
this can start simply with the availability of the Internet and mobile networks. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Security situations in society. 
ciety, the threat 
 Society 
en in Appendix 2.  
ecurity environment 
cts or the nation’s 
uations could lie somewhere between threats affecting indi-
viduals and global threats. There are interdependencies between these levels, and so 
no clear boundaries can be defined between them. 
 
The YETTS threat scenarios are: 
 Disruption affecting electronic infrastructure 
 Serious disruption affecting people’s health and income security 
 Serious disruption affecting operation of economy 
 Major accidents, natural disasters and other accidents related to environ-
mental conditions 
 Environmental threats 
.1 Security situations 
 
Society has to be able to secure vital functions in all circumstance
preparations emphasize the importance of making arrangements an
ures in times of normal circumstances. In particular, electronic comm
telecommunications and energy supply systems needed for leadership
trolling vital functi
ensuring that they can withstand the demands of different disruptiv
emergency conditions.  
 
The different security situations are specified as ‘normal circumstan
situations’ and ‘emergency conditions’, and ‘special situations’ c
 
 
 
 
 
 
Normal circumstances
• special situations
Disruptive situations
• special situations
Emergency con ns
• special sit ations
 all
ons
ditio
u
YKÄ project covers
security situati
 
 
A more detailed description of the different security situations in so
scenarios in regard to the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to
(YETTS) and the special situations is giv
 
3.2.2 Threat scenarios 
 
A threat scenario is a general description of disruptions in the s
that could endanger security in society, people’s survival prospe
independence. Such sit
27 
 
 Terrorism and organised and other serious crime 
grations 
 Political, economic and military pressure 
ry force. 
 
3.2
ation internally 
unction, 
in normal circum-
stances (of significance in terms of YKÄ or YETTS), or it may have an impact on the 
itions (YETTS). 
 severity affect-
ct of disruptions.  
 
To safeguard the work of the YKÄ project it is important to identify the YKÄ threats 
and the disruptions causing them, which could have either very localised effects or 
a much broader impact, and in different security situations.  
 
 
y disruptive 
Example: Kaminsky flaw 
 
If there is a fault in the Internet infrastructure, all Internet traffic could be under 
threat. Spring 2008 saw just such a case, when a serious flaw was discovered in 
the Internet’s DNS (Domain Name System) server system. This became known 
as the Kaminsky flaw 27. The danger of DNS vulnerability for Internet users lies 
not simply in being directed to harmful websites. Attackers can also try to hijack 
                                                
 Threats related to population mi
 Use of milita
.2.1 Seriousness of threats 
 
A disruptive event may affect only an individual company or organis
or consumers in a very localised area. It may be an obvious operating malf
or it may have more extensive significance for society even 
functioning of the state in disruptive situations and emergency cond
The impact will depend on the nature and extent of the event in question. 
 
Figure 3.3 is a schematic illustration of the different levels of threat
ing ICT systems and energy supply and the impa
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Threats and impacts at the YKÄ and YETTS levels caused b
events occurring in information infrastructure and/or in energy supply.  
Potential impacts
YETT threats (9) YKÄ threats Disruptions
Special situations
Seriousness of threat
 
 
 
27 Dan Kaminsky, Black Hat Security Conference, USA, August 2008. 
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e-mails. As this concerns traffic routing, the nature of the termin
portant (Windows, Lin
al used is unim-
ux, Macintosh, mobile phone), though each has its own in-
ce the beginning, 
 all DNS serv-
ority (FICORA), 
ill remain vulnerable (January 2009). These unrepaired 
nternet opera-
 vital functions of 
to a ‘carrier-grade’ standard, unlike telephone 
r mobile networks, for instance. The Internet has always had to be 
patched when new vulnerabilities are found. It is probable that the Internet has 
3.2
the VARE pro-
at could arise 
pecial situations. 
threat scenarios 
e current situa-
is allows an as-
ial situations and their significance for 
the government’s ICT contingency preparations (VARE) are in practice in many re-
spects the same as for the work under the YKÄ project on enhancing the usability 
and availability of information infrastructure essential for securing the vital func-
tions of society. The service chains and service production of both central govern-
ment and the information society at large are ultimately managed by the same pri-
vate companies, who are also responsible for them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
formation security problems.  
 
The Kaminsky flaw had remained undetected in the Internet sin
25 years ago. This DNS vulnerability has still not been rectified in
ers. According to the Finnish Communications Regulatory Auth
one in ten DNS servers st
servers are everywhere: in the public and private sectors, with I
tors and private individuals. 
 
DNS vulnerability is a classic example of a major threat affecting
society. The Internet was not built 
networks o
numerous other serious holes.  
 
3 Threat analysis .
 
Table 3.1 presents a small part of the threat analysis performed in 
ject28, as an example of the type of information society impact th
from YETTS threats and related s
 
The VARE project involved a more extensive analysis of the YETTS 
and related special situations and their impacts, concerning both th
tion (2008) and 2016, the end of the VARE action programme. Th
sessment of the impacts of the measures. 
 
The YETTS threat scenarios and related spec
 
 
 
28 VARE Annex 2, threat analysis and scenarios, v05, 28 May 2008. Examples of the impact of special situations 
on ICT operation and of the role of VARE. 
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YETTS threat and 
related special situation 
 Event Impact on usability and availability /  
functioning of information society 
1. Disruption affecting electronic infrastructure 
A Network and information system 
clocks working incorrectly. 
Network Time Protocol (NTP) clock service used by 
information systems fails to work properly; e-mail send and 
receive times do not match; operation of certain event-
management systems disrupted. 
B Large-scale, long-duration power 
outages due to storm. 
ICT systems switch to backup power, some of which does not 
work or is of too short duration; backup power does not 
cover all of user’s equipment. 
C Major ownership changes. Functions moved abroad, discontinued and/or companies 
broken up. 
Large-scale destruction or 
malfunction affecting public 
ICT systems. 
D Fallen power lines. Leads to localised problems in power distribution. 
Large-scale malfunction of 
technical systems for 
electronic mass media. 
A Serious faults in transmission links 
for programme distribution. 
Significant amount of public telecommunications network 
resources needed for mass media. 
 
Major disruption in energy 
network. 
A Production at Loviisa power station 
shut down. 
Large-scale disruption in energy distribution of a duration 
that exceeds the buffer from backup system. 
 B Continued disruption in 
operational monitoring of energy 
supply. 
 
 D Damage at transformer station. Local needs for backup power. 
2. Serious disruption affecting people’s health and income security 
Serious malfunction of social 
insurance service network. 
A Long-duration drop in 
usability/availability of service or 
basic registers as result of data 
corruption. 
Weakened accessibility of basic data for payment functions. 
3. Serious disruption affecting operation of economy 
A Major bank’s online functions 
closed due to serious information 
security vulnerabilities. 
Purchasing problems as result of poor operation of invoicing 
and accounts payable and receivable. 
Disruption affecting 
international and domestic 
payment systems. 
B Serious workforce problem for key 
service provider. 
Collapse in service level. 
Significant disruption in 
financial markets. 
A Significant and long-duration drop 
in value of ICT shares on stock 
exchange, corporate actions and 
investment downturn. 
Difficulties with investments, corporate actions. 
Disruption in foreign trade. A Finland’s SEPA functions closed 
due to information security 
breaches. 
Difficulty purchasing materials required for spare parts and 
development work. 
4. Major accidents, natural disasters and other accidents related to environmental conditions 
A  Immediate problems from electromagnetic pulse; restrictions 
affecting supply system flexibility; labour availability.  
Nuclear accident in Finland or 
in neighbouring regions. 
C Serious nuclear accident in region 
neighbouring on Finland. 
Maintenance of Government decision-making and operation 
of security authorities. 
Storms, floods or dam 
breaches causing evacuations 
or serious destruction. 
A Autumn storm in Helsinki region 
raises water level by 2.8 m. 
Extensive water damage for both teleoperators and customer 
organisations in the Helsinki region following blockages in 
wastewater systems, causing damage to telecommunications 
and information infrastructure. Large-scale interruptions in 
service provision. 
5. Environmental threats 
Rise in an area’s 
concentrations of heavy 
metals or chemicals to beyond 
permitted limits for health. 
A  Disruption to supply system due to flexibility restrictions. 
 
6. Terrorism and organised and other serious crime 
Serious crimes or the threat of 
such against the state’s 
highest leadership and key 
institutions or companies. 
A Criminal organisation threatens to 
injure top Government figures if 
its demands are not met. 
Attack or aggressive reconnaissance against ICT companies. 
 
7. Threats concerning population migrations 
A  Locally heightened need for data transfer. Large-scale immigration. 
B  Vandalism, rioting. 
8. Political, economic and military pressure 
Online transactions and 
financial transactions brought 
to a standstill. 
A Systematic and prolonged attack 
on the certification systems of 
Luottokunta, Finland’s leading card 
payment service provider. 
 
Problems obtaining backup resources and spare parts. 
9. Use of military force 
Table 3.1 Examples of the information society impact of special situations. 
 
A = special situation directly concerning ICT infrastructure 
B = special situation that concerns essential support arrangements for ICT infrastructure, and weakens ICT usability/availability 
C = special situation leading to significant special requirements regarding the operation and usability/availability of government ICT 
D = special situation that does not give rise to significant disruptions for ICT, or the management of which leads to special 
requirements for only a specific administrative branch’s ICT 
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4 DEFINING THE CRITICAL COMPONENTS OF INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE  
 
ure  
4.1
telephone and 
mprised of a great 
s and software 
nformation so-
 services are offered under free competition principles by 
d private ser-
organisations to 
 account of rapid 
 the business envi-
 
ives rise to new technologies, new applications and 
sectors of the in-
nterdependent, 
nd threats. 
ucture   
ucture can be di-
subsectors) and critical information 
 and their component parts (ICT layers). This is illustrated in Figure 
ponents are presented in more detail in Appendix 1. 
systems 
The European Commission lists the following critical communications systems 
 Fixed networks (landline, wi ess) 
 Mobile networks 
 Radio and navigation systems 
 Satellite systems 
 Broadcasting networks and services. 
 
al communications sys-
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
  
4.1 Critical information infrastruct
 
.1 ICT evolution, threats and vulnerabilities 
 
Local, national and global information infrastructure provides data, 
video services to public and private users in complex systems co
variety of networks, electrical and electronic equipment, computer
applications, themselves composed of many different technologies. I
ciety ICT systems and
network and service operators, system suppliers and integrators, an
vice providers and suppliers, which range in size from international 
small local companies. 
 
Information infrastructure is constantly changing and in turmoil on
technology development, new business requirements, changes in
ronment and regulations and guidance from the authorities. 
This continuous evolution g
software, and new hardware and operating models in all the sub
formation infrastructure. These subsectors and components are i
and as complex systems they are exposed to various vulnerabilities a
 
4.1.2 Critical information infrastr
 
From the YKÄ project’s perspective, critical information infrastr
vided into critical communications systems (
systems
4.129,30. Critical ICT and its com
 
4.1.2.1 Critical communications 
 
(communications subsectors) in an information society: 
 Internet 
rel
Within these, individual sectors may have their own critic
tems (e.g. the VIRVE radio network for Finland’s public authorities).
 
 
29 Towards the definition of criteria for the ICT sector, Marcelo Macera, IPSC-JRC, February 2008. 
30 Adapted here (by report author) from ‘The ARECI Study’, Availability and Robustness of Electronic Communica-
tions Infrastructures, March 2007 
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Figure 4.1 ICT layers and their critical/non-critical components as part of
mation infrastructure (CII) and part of the information society (IS), with cr
identified at a general lev
Information Society (IS)
4  Radio and navigation systems
6  Broadcasting networks and services
Information and Communication
Technology (ICT)
Critical Information 
Infrastructure (CII)Value added services
1        2       3        4        5        6
 the critical infor-
itical components 
el. 
stems of differ-
al for the activi-
tical information 
systems is therefore difficult.  
 
T d the key information systems as follows31: 
 The main information systems are systems that produce or support functions 
that, if absent or using data that is erroneous or becomes disclosed, would 
 society. The functions can also be 
such that their absence or interruption would have a paralyzing impact on so-
ciety or the operation of an organisation, or would weaken public 
safety/security.  
 
A key information system may be composed of a number of information sys-
tems that communicate with each other. 
 
                                                
 
4.1.2.2 Critical information systems 
 
In an information society there will be a great many information sy
ent kinds and at different levels. Each system, big or small, is critic
ties of one group of users or another. A single definition of a cri
he VAHTI working group has define
lead to major economic or other losses for
 
31 Securing the government’s key information systems, VAHTI 5/2004. (In Finnish ) 
1  Internet
2  Fixed networks
3  Mobile networks
Critical component (CII)
Non-critical component
5  Satellite systems
Policies and practices 
(incl. organisations, processes)
Users
Information and content
Networks (incl. data transfer, 
ICT services)
Software (incl. software plat-
forms, integration services)
Hardware
Energy (electricity)
Environment
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In addition to key information systems used in normal circumstances, there 
rgency conditions. 
ct’s perspective, critical information systems include: 
 Critical sectors’ (see 2.1.1) own information systems 
-
tor, such as the financial sector’s data centres, customer service systems and the 
nsmission control and monitoring systems 
e divided into 
isters 
rmation System 
m 
h  general basic registers 
and, the Minis-
 to serve society 
ssible as possible. Hundreds of mil-
year.33 
surance Insti-
tution of Finland, and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy collect data for 
termining basic 
nformation sys-
 that used centrally. 
Many local and regional authorities are also involved in maintaining basic registers.  
Using the ‘tunnistus.fi’ joint identification service for the Tax Administration, the 
Economy, a to-
ugust 2009, for in-
. This volume has been growing all the time. As a support service that pools 
ides reliable personal and business identification for e-
transactions, tunnistus.fi is a good example of a critical public sector service. 
munications subsector can be divided into the following operationally differ-
entiated ICT ‘layers’: 
 Added value services (understood in the broad sense) 
 Users 
 Policies and practices 
                                                
are also key information systems for use only in eme
 
From the YKÄ proje
 Public sector registers 
 
Within critical sectors are many kinds of information systems typical for each sec
TUPAS certification service, or energy tra
(SCADA32), etc.  
 
Public sector registers in Finland can b
 General basic reg
 Population Info
 Land Information Syste
 Finnish Business Information System  
 Administrative registers 
 Local and regional registers 
 Statistical systems (Statistics Finland) 
 
The bodies centrally producing and maintaining data for t e
are the Population Register Centre, the National Land Survey of Finl
try of Justice, Statistics Finland, the Tax Administration and the National Board of 
Patents and Registration. The basic register systems were created
as a whole, with the data being as easily acce
lions of ‘data units’ are disclosed to different groups of users each 
 
Other public authorities such as the Tax Administration, the Social In
various administrative registers used in, for example, taxation, de
pensions, labour market policy and social services work.  
 
Local and regional public sector organisations use a wide range of i
tems and registers. The data content is generally broader than
 
Social Insurance Institution and the Ministry of Employment and the 
tal of more than 700,000 identity checks were made during A
stance
resources and prov
 
4.1.2.3 ICT layers 
  
Each com
 
32 SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition). 
33 According to a conservative estimate, the number of data items disclosed to different user groups from basic 
registers in 2004, employing a variety of methods, totalled over 300 million. Source: Preliminary report on elec-
tronic registration of ownership of housing company shares, National Board of Patents and Registration publica-
tions 1/2004. (In Finnish) 
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 Information and content 
orks  Netw
 Software and application platforms, system integration 
 Energy 
Information infrastructure is also reliant on other critical infrastructures, especially 
 STATE OF CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
 
5.1
5.1
 throughout soci-
and citizens. Be-
 Internet.  
 side, however. It provides organised crime with a 
real-time, convenient and global marketing and sales/purchasing channel (drugs, 
onplace and 
ice (DoS) attacks 
5.1
The Internet has become critical information infrastructure. The Internet refers here 
nnections and 
 Internet is de-
abled by an 
s 
the interconnection traffic between operators. Critical information infrastructure in 
 
ccessibility of 
ain extent, the status of the information society in 
general. Without a sufficiently fast broadband it is not possible to use the Internet’s 
thousands of services effectively. Neither can a sufficiently high-quality infrastruc-
ture be built without a fast broadband. 
 
tatus report. 
Serious risks and threats regarding the infrastructure and operation of the Internet 
are set out in more detail in Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
                                                
 Hardware 
 Other infrastructure support and functioning. 
 
energy (electricity). 
 
  
5 CURRENT
DEFINITION OF ‘CRITICAL’ 
 Current state 
 
.1 Strategic importance of Internet and mobile networks 
 
The Internet and mobile networks have a central and growing role
ety. Both are vital for the public sector, organisations, businesses 
fore long, virtually all services in society will have transferred to the
 
The Internet also has a down
human trafficking, terrorism). Information security attacks are comm
hundreds of different malware items emerge daily.  Denial-of-serv
cause major inconvenience and losses for companies. 
 
.2 Internet: critical infrastructure  
 
to the technical infrastructure together with services, protocols, co
standards, which is built on and around Internet protocols (IPs). The
fined via user experiences of the applications (data, audio, video) en
Internet connection service (transmitted by operators). It therefore also include
Finland thus includes FICIX34 and TREX35.  
Broadband access is a key feature of Internet use. The speed and a
broadband also reflect, to a cert
The Internet also plays a key role in the assembly of a national s
 
 
34 Beginning its operations in 1993, FICIX (Finnish Communication and Internet Exchange ry) is the biggest 
Internet exchange point in Finlan;, http://www.ficix.fi/. 
35 TREX (Tampere Region Exchange), the next generation internet exchange point, http://www.trex.fi/.  
34 
 
5.1.3 Mobile networks  
 
5.1
st part of a high 
ghout the coun-
e accessibility of services, 
ent in regard to certain sparsely populated areas.  
5.1
ot for publica-
ctivities).  One 
tion anywhere in 
 wireless tech-
 used is primarily either a mobile UMTS service or Digita’s @450 service. 
Mbit/s 
inland by the end 
situations under normal circumstances 
 cover not only 
hrough 
irements. 
ncy preparations for emergency conditions 
onditions con-
ation should also 
cy measures for 
5.1
As critical infrastructure, Finland’s fixed networks are of a high standard and access 
onsiderable room for improve-
work in regard to future broadband needs, especially in 
 areas. Certain preparations have already been made for this, as 
nd plans to build 
inistry is respon-
is the responsi-
thority (FICORA)36. 
 
re set out in Appendix 1.  
 
5.1.5 Public/private partnership 
 
Critical infrastructure is for producing or supplying an essential service or product. 
Society’s vital services, such as ICT services and energy supplies, are provided al-
most completely by means of private sector products and services. This applies to 
the ICT services of both the public and private sectors.  
 
                                                
.3.1 Situation assessment 
 
As critical infrastructure, Finland’s mobile networks are for the mo
quality and the accessibility of services is moderate or better throu
try, due to the competitive environment. In terms of th
there is still room for improvem
 
.3.2 Risks and development opportunities 
 
Mobile networks have their own infrastructure risks (Appendix 1, n
tion, section 24(1)(8-9) of the Act on the Openness of Government A
risk is the guarantee of access to a 1 Mbit/s broadband connec
Finland (in 2010) - this has been defined as a universal service. The
nology
 
A second risk is associated with the Government’s decision that a 100 
broadband connection should be available almost everywhere in F
of 2015.   
 
5.1.3.3 Contingency preparations for disruptive 
 
In Finland, contingency preparations for information infrastructure
emergency conditions but also disruptions under normal circumstances, t
sectoral legislation and with the aid of commercial service-level requ
 
5.1 .4.3  Continge
 
In addition to the general contingency preparations for emergency c
cerning telecommunications infrastructure (section 9.2.6), consider
be given, in the case of mobile networks, to special contingen
emergency conditions (see 9.2.3). 
 
.4 Fixed networks 
 
to network services is good. However, there is still c
ment in the fixed net
sparsely populated
the Ministry of Transport and Communications already has broadba
a fibre network by 2015 that would reach almost everyone. The M
sible for the programme’s implementation, while the practical side 
bility of the Finnish Communications Regulatory Au
The vulnerabilities of a fixed network a
 
36 http://www.ficora.fi/index/saadokset/ohjeet/laajakaista2015.html. 
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5.2 De sired state, definit
 
ion of critical 
5.2
, are all depend-
encies Nx(N-
tures. Everything is interdependent. In 
ritical for cer-
ing issues are important in re-
at extent can specifications be set by a third party, such as a public au-
ulation M54 (on Priority 
 Communications 
ulatory Authority 
veloped? 
hat extent can 
ority? A general 
rket Act. One 
8 (on the Qual-
f Communications Networks and Services). 
r and the (com-
r relationship is not 
 What if the subscriber does not understand himself/herself to be an im-
plementer of a vital function? 
lude a service 
ents? 
5.2 ructure are 
cas
lity requirements for critical infrastructure or a component 
thereof may be more critical for one organisation than another (Figure 5.2). Online 
services and the Internet are critical for a hotel or travel company (organisation 1), 
for instance. For a housing construction company (organisation 2), on the other 
hand, the availability of fuel and mobile services may be of greater importance. In 
the financial sector (organisatio  telecommunications networks and service cen-
tres will have a key role, requiri a high quality standard. The highest quality will be 
required of all components in th  case of networks and services (e.g. TUVE) in the 
security sector (organisation 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.1 Everything is interdependent 
 
The vital functions of society, and especially critical infrastructures
ent on ICT systems. The ‘N-squared’ formula applies (interdepend
1)/2), where N is the number of infrastruc
practice there is no communications network or service that is not c
tain users.  
 
Defining this criticality is very challenging. The follow
lation to the definition and to the desired state: 
 Is one thing more essential than another?  
 Who determines the definition and using which criteria?  
 To wh
thority? One set of criteria has been defined in Reg
Rating, Redundancy, Power Supply and Physical Protection of
Networks and Services) of the Finnish Communications Reg
(FICORA). 
 To what standard should usability and availability be de
 What reduction in usability and availability is permitted? To w
specifications be set by a third party, such as a public auth
definition is given in section 128 of the Communications Ma
more specific set of criteria has been defined in Regulation M5
ity and Universal Service o
 Can service level agreements be made between the subscribe
munications network/service) provider? 
 What about networks in which the subscribe-use
clear? 
 What if the service provider’s product range does not inc
level agreement for higher usability and availability? 
 Should requirements always be incorporated into agreem
 
.2 Usability and availability requirements for critical information infrast
e-specific 
 
The usability and availabi
n 3),
ng 
e
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
al infrastructure 
tity (by type of organisation).  
 
strates the principle that the basic quality offered via the quality 
. FICORA M54/2008 for telecommunications 
l competition is 
 supplementary 
5.3
 
5.3.1 International perspective 
 
The European Union has stated that because critical information infrastructures are 
ndent on other in-
anteed merely 
ion. Resilience of critical information infrastruc-
tures is in itself a cross-border process, and in some cases a global one (Internet).37 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Basic and enhanced quality required in principal for critic
components of a business/other en
 
   
Critical infrastructure 
component/service 
(organisation 1) 
Basic 
Enhanced 
   
 
           
Critical infrastructure 
component/service 
(organisation 2) 
Critical infrastructure 
component/service 
(organisation 3) 
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Figure 5.2 also illu
criteria set by public authorities (e.g
networks; Electricity Market Act for power production) or via genera
included in the agreed basic price for everyone everywhere, but that
fees can be paid for obtaining enhanced quality. 
 
Definition of usability and availability criteria  
global and closely interlinked, and because they are mutually depe
frastructures, their information security and resilience cannot be guar
by national means without coordinat
 
37 2 April 2009 EU Commission: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Critical Information Infra-
structure Protection - “Protecting Europe from large scale cyber-attacks and disruptions: enhancing prepared-
ness, security and resilience” Impact Assessment (Part 1). 
37 
 
5.3.2 ‘Grey area’ criteria 
ions networks and 
ptive situations 
Authority 
tenance of communica-
tions networks and services and procedures in the event of faults and disruptions38. 
Work is under way on legislation dealing with the ‘grey area’ (see 7.2.1). 
 
services 
d be examined on a 
iness models, ser-
s, contingency 
and above the normal range of activities. 
Contingency preparation requirements and measures ultimately culminate in addi-
tional costs. Are these costs to be paid for by the provider or the user of the critical 
information infrastructure, or by another party? 
stating that it is 
centive for pri-
tion to a level 
ments would normally require40. 
  
 
                                                
 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the different types of status for communicat
services and the legislation applying in normal circumstances, disru
and emergency conditions. The Finnish Communications Regulatory 
(FICORA) has completed work on a Regulation on the main
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Determining the status of communications networks and 
and deciding on criteria and measures.39 
 
 
The measures are not simply a technical matter. The issue shoul
more comprehensive basis, giving consideration to processes, bus
vice level agreements, ownership relations, etc. For ICT companie
preparations require additional input over 
Normal circumstances Emergency conditions
Who decides?
(criteria and measures)
Status of communications networks  and services
 
In April 2009, the European Commission issued a commentary 
commonly perceived that market forces do not provide sufficient in
vate operators to invest in critical information infrastructure protec
that govern
 
38 Regulation M57/2009 on the maintenance of communications networks and services and procedures in the 
event of faults and disruptions. (In Finnish) 
39 Seminar on the YKÄ project, 15 April 2009, Sami Kilkkilä, Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority 
(FICORA). 
40 European Commission statement: “In fact, it is a common perception that market forces do not provide suffi-
cient incentives to private operators for investing to protect CIIs at the level that governments would normally 
demand – a market failure.” 
CMA & AP Emergency Powers ActPEC
’Grey area’
(normal circumstances)
sruptive situationDi
CMA (Communications Market Act)
APPEC (Act on the Protection of Privacy in Electronic Communications)
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6 SECURING VITAL FUNCTIONS AND THEIR USABILITY AND AVAILABILITY 
 
adoption of information society technologies 
 
6.1
ieve a wider 
uctivity and 
n of people. 
option of information society technologies can only occur if all the par-
formation so-
own perspective 
 trust. 
 
n Table 6.1. Improving the position of 
consumers requires a responsible approach from all concerned, including consum-
ers themselves
 Different perspectives regarding tru
6.1 Motive: wider 
.1 Guaranteeing trust  
 
The aim of the Ubiquitous Information Society Programme is to ach
adoption of information society technologies, which will boost prod
competitiveness in the national economy and increase the satisfactio
The wider ad
ties involved feel that there is sufficiently well-founded trust in the in
ciety. All sides – public sector, businesses and citizens – have their 
in regard to
The different perspectives on trust are given i
. 
  
Table 6.1 st   in services.
 
Attribute Measure (example) 
Online access (network accessibility) 24/7, 8am-4pm, 99.9% 
Service level Service response time 
Privacy protection See Table 4.2 
Lawfulness of content  
Availability of services 24/7, 8am-4pm, 99.9% 
Information security Strong, weak 
 
6.1.1.1 Usability and availability 
One of the most important aspects in the wider adoption of information society 
tion infrastruc-
6.1
Measuring trust in the information society presents a challenge. Among the compo-
nents given in Table 6.1, a second component alongside usability and availability is 
privacy protection, which is also dealt with in Table 6.2.  
 
There are four groups of threats41,42 against privacy: data collection, data process-
). These are divided into 
 information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
technologies is guaranteeing the usability and availability of informa
ture (Table 6.1).  
 
NB. Usability and availability are defined in section 1 (see 1.1.1). 
 
.1.2 Privacy and threats against privacy 
 
ing, data transmission and invasion of privacy (Solove39
sixteen subgroups. Privacy alone is a multidimensional concept in an
society.  
 
41 Solove, D. J. 2006: A Taxonomy of Privacy. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 154. 
42 Janne Lindqvist, Privacy protection in a networked society: Eyes open – Information society threats and oppor-
tunities, Parliament’s Committee for the Future, publication 1/2008. (In Finnish) 
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 6.2 ain
 
 
Table  Threats ag st privacy40. 
Main 
group 
Data collec-
tion 
Data processing D ns-ata tra
mission 
Invasion of 
privacy 
  
Surveilla Combinin Bre ch of trust 
 
Intrusion nce g data a
Question Identifica Disclosure Harassment  
 
ing tion 
 Not secur b ation  e Pu lic
 Secondary 
uses 
Widened 
accessibility 
 
 Exclusion Blackmail  
  Theft  
 
 
 
 
Subgroups 
  Misrepresentation  
 
 
6.1.2 Ensuring ICT operations 
 
tTrust is built by ensuring the opera ion of information infrastructure vital to society  
aspects (service level) 
 through information security measures 
ful content 
ivities  
aking contingency preparations for cyber attacks and malware.  
 
ety requires that it 
 identified and that the threats and risks be realistically surveyed and solutions 
outlined. This is especially important at the infrastructure level, where the impacts 
6.2 ture are ele-
me
6.2.1 Usability and availability are made up of the usability and availability of service 
com
ility and avail-
ability, requires analysis of the infrastructure’s components. This can be based on 
examining technical components of the product/service or examining the compo-
nents as a process. Both approaches are needed. The process approach indicates 
what is done within the ICT components at different stages, and how this is done, 
and this focuses on business principles.  
 
It is not possible through the YKÄ work to specify detailed indicators of the usability 
and availability of each layer and component in the critical information infrastructure. 
Usability and availability and the enhancement of these is part of the business of the 
company providing the product or service, and the objectives are defined on a case 
 by investing in usability and availability (convenience) 
 by tackling harmful and unlaw
 by investing in CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) act
 by ensuring the operation of online banking  
 through individual protection projects  
 by m
6.1.3 Identifying critical information infrastructure 
 
Ensuring the operation of information infrastructure vital to soci
be
are extensive. 
 
 Functions and operators within critical information infrastruc
nts in a process 
 
ponents 
 
The specification of information infrastructure quality, and of its usab
40 
 
by case basis in agreements between buyer and supplier (e.g. SOPIV
not for publication, section 24(1)(8-9) of 
A, Appendix 2, 
the Act on the Openness of Government Ac-
layers and the 
 these at a general level. In reality, for each ICT 
 are analysed on 
ecific basis.  
 
a mple o tant c onen tion infrastructure 
an ance  
 
tivities), with their quality definitions (SLA43).  
 
Table 6.3 uses examples to illustrate the critical components of ICT 
importance and vulnerability of
element the critical components and their vulnerability/importance
a customer/organisation-sp
T ble 6.3 Exa f the most impor ritical comp ts of informa
d their import  and vulnerability. 
No. ICT layer Critical component Importanc  e Vulnerability 
9 Added value ser- Customer expertise +++ +++  
vices 
8 ers Usability and availability +++++ +++  Us
7 nd prac-
s 
t expertise +++ +++ Policies a
tice
Agreemen
6 Information and 
ontent 
Reliability +++++ ++++ 
c
5 Networks ility +++++ +++++ Reliab
4 Software Reliability ++++ +++ 
3 Hardware Expertise ++++ ++++ 
2 Energy Reliable supply +++ +++ 
1 Environmental 
factors 
Transportation, payment +++ +++ 
(the more plus-signs the mo
 
re important/vulnerable) 
6.2
ctions and opera-
rs are considered elements in a process.  
6.2
The process definitions indicate that they are real-time operations concerned with 
cal systems and so on function in practice. 
sation’s struc-
ces for performing 
ines a com-
pany’s core processes in slightly more detail.  
 
6.2.2.2 External operators – continuity management 
Operators (organisations) that are external to the organisation in question also par-
ticipate in process activities. For the government’s critical ICT functions, this is 
agreed via the SOPIVA procedures and related requirements. Agreements made be-
tween purchaser and supplier can include e.g. service level agreements in which 
the service level and other matters concerning the quality of deliveries are agreed. 
 
                                                
.2 Processes in business 
 
In components of critical information infrastructure, individual fun
to
 
.2.1 Processes and structures 
 
how an organisation’s people, techni
Processes are thus normally an independent dimension of an organi
ture. 
 
A business process is a group of interrelated tasks and the resour
them, with which business results can be obtained. Appendix 1 exam
 
 
 
43 SLA = Service Level Agreement. 
41 
 
The main aim of the SOPIVA recommendations is to get the organisa
management to determine the strategy and aims for continuity m
tion’s (senior) 
anagement of the 
organisation’s operations, and to organise and allocate responsibility for matters 
ng continuity management.  
 
6.2
arts of the net-
d availability in re-
ry challenging. 
 their own, often 
effective, processes to exert influence in business communities in line with 
n facilitate this type of de-
velopment, although they undoubtedly also have their good side (e.g. cloud com-
6.2 ge 
and business processes. The system’s re-
ents may, for 
 security. Thus 
in close collabo-
ration with management of business processes. 
n society with the 
rty providing 
t can be drawn up and understood.  
 
 
 
6.2.4 YKÄ processes 
ors 
hould be possi-
elationships of 
perating proc-
ks. This is an espe-
 
Enhancing the usability and availability of information infrastructure essential for 
securing the vital functions of society (the YKÄ project) is itself a collection of busi-
ness processes, or ‘YKÄ processes’. The YKÄ processes are high-level tasks (defini-
tion, planning, publishing, management, government control mechanisms, supervi-
sion). The tasks, specifications and requirements are drawn from the strategies, 
programmes, projects and agreements of central and local government and the pri-
vate sector (public/private partnership). The processes concern the critical ICT 
components identified (Figure 6.1).  
 
concerni
.2.3 Challenges 
 
Processes or process resources can be located globally in different p
work. The requirements for trust and, within this, for usability an
gard to critical information infrastructure can thus sometimes be ve
In operational networks there may even be hostile parties that use
very 
their vested interests. The new network models may eve
puting).  
 
.3 Usability and availability of a critical ICT solution at the planning sta
 
Planning is based on business activities 
quirements are determined by the business processes. The requirem
instance, be connected with usability and availability or information
the planning of usability and availability, for instance, is managed 
 
The public sector entity planning a secure and reliable informatio
aid of standards and statutes must have the same expertise as the pa
the services in order that technical agreemen
 
 
 
 
 
 
In identifying critical information infrastructure, individual functions and operat
are considered parts of a process. In charting threats and risks, it s
ble to take realistic account of their probabilities and of the interr
risks and threats. The solutions outlined should focus on ensuring o
esses and on the most likely and most significant threats and ris
cially challenging task. 
Trust in the information society – and within it enhancing the usability and availability 
ation infrastructure essential for securing the vital functions of society – can in 
practice occur only if usability and availability requirements are an integral part of the 
management 
of inform
real operations of organisations, i.e. of their business processes and the 
of these. This applies to all levels and all security situations.  
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The YKÄ processes are defined and managed via public sector stee
by designated organisations with specific responsibilities (Finnish Com
Regulatory Authority (FICORA), the National Emergency Suppl
ernment Information Security Mana
ring mechanisms 
munications 
y Agency, the Gov-
gement Board (VAHTI), the Advisory Committee 
for Data Administration in Public Administration (JUHTA), the Government IT 
Shared Service Centre (VIP), private sector). 
 
Figure 6.1 The wider adoption of information society technologies requires trust, which is 
built using high-quality YKÄ processes guided by the aims and requirements of the strate-
gies, programmes and projects for the critical ICT components identified. The strategies, 
programmes and projects in the upper part of the figure are described in Appendix 2 (not for 
publication, section 24(1)(8-9) of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities). 
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6.3 Identity management – a new CII  
 
6.3  
ll circumstances 
ed. It is known 
ommunications 
transportation networks) can endure only short breaks and disruptions without 
users noticing. Electronic transactions, payments, entry systems, etc. always re-
 in the event 
 unavailable. In 
information rather than 
d this is a growing trend. Identification prob-
g various means peculiar to the different 
s’, its own pro-
6.3
e traditionally been at the forefront in developing identity verifica-
tion. In addition the various credit and debit cards, ‘citizen cards’, Kela health in-
of each other 
ptible to iden-
6.3.3 Information set free 
chnology. A 
lex systems and 
rminal equip-
, mobile phones, credit cards, bank and retailer 
applications, databases, etc.).  
 way that the 
he idea is to 
be rid of the data as soon as possible, to avoid it getting into the wrong hands. The 
new phenomena to have emerged in the information society include various net-
work communities (Facebook, MySpace, Bebo, LinkedIn, Google), which already 
f ure the ‘digital lives’ of millions of users.  
 
The above developments, which only scratch the surface, weaken the identity secu-
rity and trust of users, and in turn add to the growth in cyber crime.  Identity man-
agement has not evolved in the desired direction, not in Finland or anywhere else.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.1 Each critical infrastructure has its own identity management systems
 
Critical infrastructures are technical systems that must operate in a
if society’s vital functions and associated services are to be maintain
that local, national and international networks (e.g. electrical, telec
and 
quire identity verification, whether or not the user is a person, device, network or 
service. 
 
A key issue is how identity is to be verified in an information society
that other infrastructures (e.g. bank services, electricity supply) are
an information society, there is a strong reliance on 
physical components or equipment, an
lems have been managed for decades usin
critical infrastructures. Each of these infrastructures has its own ‘key
cedures, documentation or tests, before the service can be used. 
 
.2 Dozens of different identity verification methods 
 
The banks hav
surance cards, etc. have functioned as identity cards independently 
and without any standardisation. Many electronic identities are susce
tity theft. This is one of the biggest information security problems.  
 
 
The information society is moving towards an uneasy alliance with te
very wide variety of information is being transmitted via very comp
networks and dozens of different protocols, from a large array of te
ment and applications (PCs, servers
 
Moreover, many services and applications have been built in such a
data within them is not retained in the terminal for very long. Indeed, t
eat
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7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USABILITY/AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION 
TINGENCY PREPARATIONS  
 
standards 
7.1
this should be based on in-
ternational markets and on national measures and resources. Contingency prepara-
ing of society 
.  
ell-functioning 
 certain circum-
ction as backup 
iety’s main func-
national means. For this reason, it is necessary to supplement and 
n national security of supply by making use of EU membership and other 
cooperation in the field of international security of supply. However, contingency 
e basis of na-
7.
als for business 
peration, agreements made with customers, and risk management in these areas. 
l contingency 
n. These statu-
 disrupt the op-
n this regard, 
tion legisla-
Various companies and business organisations take part in contingency planning on 
isation’s different 
ergency condi-
uthorities and 
security circumstances. With the increasing interdependence between the public 
tions on both sides must be incorporated in service 
agreements.  
 different coun-
 be produced at 
lowest cost. The consequence of this is that the fortunes of businesses and gov-
ernments have become ever more differentiated from each other. The opportunities 
for national control are diminishing constantly. 
 
7.1.1.2 Non-governmental organisations 
 
In securing vital functions of society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
based on voluntary activity also play a significant role alongside the government, 
authorities and businesses, both in the implementation of practical security and in 
enhancing crisis resilience. The inclusion of these NGOs is based on their own oper-
INFRASTRUCTURE AND CON
7.1 Basis, current status and 
 
.1 Basis for contingency preparations 
 
The general aim for Finland’s security of supply is that 
tions are made to secure the infrastructure essential for the function
and for the continuity of critical production under all circumstances
 
A significant share of the country’s security of supply relies on w
markets and national and international companies and networks. In
stances, systems that are dispersed across borders could also fun
systems for each other. It is no longer possible to secure all of soc
tions using 
strengthe
preparations for the most serious crises must always be made on th
tional measures. 
 
1.1.1 Businesses 
 
For businesses, contingency preparations focus on the fundament
o
To the extent that this is not sufficient for society at large, additiona
preparation responsibilities are set out as obligations in the legislatio
tory obligations for contingency preparations must not be allowed to
eration of the market or distort equitable competitive conditions. I
particular attention must be given to both the Finnish and EU competi
tion. 
 
a contractual basis through the National Emergency Supply Organ
sectors and pools. In the case of companies of key importance in em
tions which produce services for the public sector, for the security a
for other key companies, the aim is to guarantee their operating prerequisites in all 
and private sectors, obliga
 
In global markets the value chains of companies are spread across
tries and continents according to where the necessary functions can
45 
 
ating goals, and these must be taken into consideration when plan
measures. In today’s society, the role of individual people as operators 
ning collaborative 
in various 
networks is also of growing importance in contingency preparations and related in-
tion provision. 
 
7.1
infrastructure in 
e and are con-
rther developed. The Finnish Communications 
Regulatory Authority (FICORA) has introduced a comprehensive range of regula-
lso take into account the requirements for contingency 
7.1
structure (the 
r securing 
ramme elements 
here are the government’s VARE project, the Internal Security Programme, and the 
ans and agreements 
ergency Supply Agency, SOPIVA). The practical measures for the wider 
 the government’s ICT contingency 
preparations are based on services offered by the same private sector operators.  
ons of busi-
7.1
e market economy felt by companies and exacer-
bated through networking appear to result in minimal contingency preparations in 
 of backup 
 networks are 
tively high level 
ust in the network and in each other. Competition appears to be keeping infor-
mation networks in a constantly underprepared state. The incentives are not in 
lising further and thus to the enlarge-
ment of value networks and lengthening of value chains, which exacerbates the 
t can alone 
hieve a significant benefit from contingency preparations. Common strategies are 
nd resolved, but 
the complexity of the system means that it is impossible to foresee everything.  
 
7.2 Adequacy of legislation for contingency preparations 
 
7.2.1 Developing legislation on contingency preparations concerning the information in-
frastructure 
 
On 1 November 2007, the Minister of Communications set up a working group to 
assess the need for regulatory amendments within the purview of the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications in regard to contingency preparations, taking into 
forma
.2 Standards 
 
The standards for usability and availability of critical information 
regard to communications networks and services are in good shap
stantly being supplemented and fu
tions and guidelines that a
preparations and set out various measures. 
 
.3 Contingency preparations and YKÄ 
 
Enhancing the usability and availability of essential information infra
work of the YKÄ project) is clearly related to contingency preparations fo
society’s vital functions (the YETTS work). Important common prog
National Emergency Supply Organisation and its contingency pl
(National Em
adoption of information society technologies and
 
The YKÄ project is also clearly related to the contingency preparati
nesses and NGOs. 
 
.4 Challenge: information networks constantly underprepared?  
 
The competitive pressures of th
general and within information networks in particular, e.g. in terms
power, reserve equipment and staff backup. Today’s information
tuned extremely efficiently, because the parties involved have a rela
of tr
place. Legislative provisions are needed. 
 
Competition has also led to companies specia
vulnerability of the system in crisis situations. No single participan
ac
needed. 
 
The undoubted problem areas referred to above can be identified a
46 
 
account factors such as actions required under the Strategy for Sec
tions Vital to Society (YETTS). In addition, the working group was a
the need and potential for legislative means to stre
uring the Func-
sked to assess 
ngthen the cooperation between 
telecommunications companies and companies responsible for energy distribution. 
ations services 
e situations by 
 situations that 
erators. The 
dentify the disruptive and other situations in society that 
 the Emergency 
he interrup-
ation security, 
ining spare 
ications and 
ces can lead to serious situations in which the operation of functions vi-
 respond to such 
ration between 
legislative means may help resilience in serious disrup-
tive situations. 
 
For this purpose, legislative powers are needed in order to ensure a more rapid 
switch to crisis management st us and, once the situation has passed, a return to 
normal circumstances (Figure 7.1).  
 
preparations improved through legislation. 
 
 
7.2.2 Guidelines for contingency preparations 
 
Society’s vital functions have become more vulnerable than before, due to the 
widespread interdependence between ICT access and the availability of electricity. 
National services also rely increasingly on international networks and services (e.g. 
banking services). Society’s vital functions are thus more vulnerable not only to na-
tional but also international cyber attacks.  
 
The working group continued until the end of November 2009. 
 
Telecommunications companies (network companies and communic
providers) are often able to manage and cover problematic disruptiv
means of agreements. However, there are certain serious disruptive
cannot always be managed through mutual agreement between op
working group’s aim is to i
do not fall under the concept of emergency conditions referred to in
Powers Act, but during which the government would need to support t
tion-free operation of the market.  
 
Natural phenomena, especially disruptive situations affecting inform
disruptions to electricity grids and power distribution, problems obta
parts, and market disruptions and other disruptions in telecommun
online servi
tal to society can no longer be guaranteed. It must be possible to
situations, and rapidly, too, with sufficient powers. Promoting coope
different operators through 
at
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Serious
disruption
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Contingency 
E
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This invites the question of which powers set out in contingency preparations 
8 ENERGY SUPPLY FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS AND THE 
inal equip-
wer for several 
hours. Traditional landline phones can also be used to make emergency calls even if 
 examples of what is possible 
during a power outage.  
8.1
 
 and distribution 
er production 
 
ain grid. Some 
ducing electricity are connected directly to the main grid, as 
 also be connected 
 power from the main 
 areas. 
Homes get their electricity from the distribution networks. Industry, the retail 
 network, re-
rid according to the amount of energy used. 
ly exposed to the elements. One tenth of the medium voltage 
ne third of the low voltage grids runs via underground cables. In the cen-
tres of towns and cities, in particular, the power lines are underground cables. 
, but doing so 
8.2
8.2 s 
 
Society’s dependence on electricity has grown so great that disruptions in power 
distribution can paralyze daily functions completely. Water distribution, wastewater 
operations, fuel distribution, operation of shops and bank cash dispensers, tele-
communications and heating all rely completely on electricity. They would come to 
a standstill in the event of a power outage due to stormy weather or a technical 
fault. The electricity dependence of a high-tech society presents risks that should 
be taken more carefully into account in contingency planning, in both the public and 
the private sector. 
 
should be invoked in major disasters. 
 
ADEQUACY OF PROTECTION 
 
No information society can function without electrical power. Some term
ment can use batteries, however, and base stations have backup po
there is a power outage in the home. These are a few
 
The YKÄ project is thus directly concerned with power availability.  
 
 Finland’s power grid 
Finland’s power system comprises the main grid, regional networks
networks. Electrical energy in the main grid is transmitted from pow
locations and from abroad to centres of consumption. 
Most of the electricity consumed in Finland is transmitted via the m
of the power plants pro
are major consumers such as large factories. Power plants may
to a regional or distribution network. 
 
The electrified sections of the rail network take their traction
grid, as does Helsinki Airport. 
 
The regional and distribution networks transmit power within their own
trade, services and agriculture get their power from the distribution
gional network and the main g
 
The main grid is main
grid and o
 
The aim is to have more underground cables for the low voltage grid
for the main grid would be very costly. 
 
 Importance of electricity  
 
.1 Power outage
48 
 
By official definition, a long-duration power outage is one that last 
minutes
more than three 
matically rein-
efined as one in 
onsumers are paid a fixed sum of compensation for a power outage lasting 
more than 12 hours. The fixed compensation sums are specified in the Electricity 
ower plant shut-
 consumers. 
f peak consumption 
uld even lead to a power outage affecting the entire country. 
 the main grid causes a nationwide power outage, this would last longest 
h of the country, as power would, in such circumstances, first be re-
 to northern Finland.42 
 
8.3
8.3
Authority 
l Protection of 
need for 
p power for components of communications networks and services. Compo-
 basis of their im-
 for determining the priority 
n. The priority ratings concern phone services, 
s media services and other communication 
For example, a component that affects communications services across a large 
≥200,000 users, or 
ich requires backup accumulators for at least 6 hours (if 
the component of the communications network or service is connected to a power 
plant system in which the power backup is a fixed backup power plant, the accumu-
 accumulators are sufficient for the basic 
needs of the information society in normal circumstances. In Finland, too, there 
 storms, where 6 
hour backups would not suffice.  
 
 
                                                
44. In such cases, the supply of electricity does not get auto
stated after a short period. A long-duration power outage is also d
which c
Market Act. 
 
An individual fault in Finland’s main grid, leading for instance to a p
ting down, is not sufficient to cause long-duration power outages for
However, two such major faults or a fault appearing at a time o
and low production co
If a fault in
in the sout
turned
 Reserve power 
 
.1 Standards 
 
Regulation M54/200845 of the Finnish Communications Regulatory 
(FICORA) on ‘Priority Rating, Redundancy, Power Supply and Physica
Communications Networks and Services’ includes regulations on the 
backu
nents of communications networks and services are rated on the
portance in descending order from 1 to 5. The criteria
ratings are described in the Regulatio
broadband services, e-mail services, mas
services. 
 
geographical area (over 20,000 km2) or a component that affects 
 a phone service covering ≥50,000 users, or 
 a broadband service covering ≥50,000 users, or 
 an e-mail service covering  
 a mass media service covering ≥100,000 users, or 
 another communication service covering ≥200,000 users, 
 
is of class 2 importance, wh
lator’s minimum duration is 3 hours)43.  
 
The minimum backup periods for backup
are, however, occasionally longer power outages caused by major
 
Rectifying storm damage requires that, on top of everything else, field personnel are 
able to communicate using mobile connections. This represents a clear dependency 
relationship between power grids and mobile networks. 
 
44 Long-duration power outages and securing vital functions of society, Ministry of Defence, 28 May 2009. (In 
Finnish) 
45 Regulation M54/2008, Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA). 
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8.4 Adequ
 
acy of today’s protection systems 
8.4
sue regula-
RA) in telecom-
munications, and VAHTI in respect of information security for the government), and 
g. regarding ca-
selves from, 
contained in 
n their computers. 
 
f protection systems in the government’s vi-
munications 
8.4
d systematically 
drawn up on 
the basis of questionnaires. The figure does not show areas of information security 
where, in practice, almost 100% of agencies already operate in accordance with 
basic objectives. Such areas include, in the field of IT information security, tackling 
malware prior to e-mail distribution and in workstations, and, in the field of public 
sector information security, maintaining on at least a part-time basis an employee 
in charge of information security who reports to senior management.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
.1 Overview  
 
ICT systems are protected at a number of levels. Public authorities is
tions (e.g. the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICO
industry has its own regulations, as does the real estate sector (e.
bling).  
 
In addition, users have a wide range of practices for protecting them
for instance, malware and for encrypting data being transmitted or 
files o
Below is a discussion of the adequacy o
tal information systems, the ICT services of municipalities and in com
systems. 
 
.2 Government information systems – situation 2008 
 
The government’s information security situation has been monitore
since 2000. Figure 8.146 presents the statistical trend for 2002-2008, 
 
 
46 Government Information Security Management Board (VAHTI) report on operations for 2008, Vahti 1/2009, 
Ministry of Finance. (In Finnish) 
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uring ‘government 
 the Government 
The ministries and agencies have invested extensively in developing information 
ifferent units, 
and disruptive 
uidelines. Pro-
s and other IT security devel-
carried out 
uations, and the 
formation security attacks requiring special action70. Malware and in-
formation security attacks are an increasing problem. In 2008, about 16% of gov-
ernment organisations found th selves the target of an attack.  
 
To manage the risks posed to operations and to ensure continuity, the government 
must be able in future to significantly further improve its contingency preparations 
for information security problems and its management of non-conformity situations, 
as well as its knowledge and management of different information system and net-
work situations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Trend in information security. The data was collected d
information security’ theme days arranged annually in December by
Information Security Management Board (VAHTI). 
 
 
 
security cooperation among information security organisations and d
contingency preparations and data protection for non-conformity 
situations and emergency conditions, and agency-level plans and g
tection from malware and information security attack
opment have been central to the continuous information security work 
in every government organisation. 
 
Figure 8.2 illustrates the trend in malware-induced denial-of-use sit
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Figure 8.2 Impact of information security problems in government admi
Malware 
nted
Attacks detected that
preve require special action
nistration, 2001-
2008. 
 
ent’s informa-
8.4
The protection requirements for service providers are specified in agreements be-
 The biggest private-sector providers of public-
oenator, Logica and Fujitsu. Their protection 
ment in the pro-
se, too, are ar-
stems 
ponsible for the 
protection regula-
 the Protection 
8.4.4.1 Regulation M54/2008  
lic communica-
tworks and of the communications services 
ndancy and reserve routes, power supply 
otection. The Regulation does not apply 
to the temporary provision of communications networks or services, or to tempo-
rary capacity, DVB-H network transmitters or radio operators whose licence speci-
fies population coverage of less than 85%. 
 
Components of communications networks and services are categorised on the basis 
of their importance in descending order from 1 to 5; an example was given above 
                                                
 
The situation in regard to the adequacy of protection for the governm
tion systems is good and improving. 
 
.3 Private sector 
 
tween service buyers and providers.
sector information services are Tiet
procedures are of a high standard. There may be room for improve
tection systems of smaller service providers and service chains. The
ranged through agreements, and the agreements are monitored. 
 
 
8.4.4 Communications sy
 
The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) is res
protection standards for communications systems. The numerous 
tions47 are based on the Communications Market Act and the Act on
of Privacy in Electronic Communications. 
 
48
 
FICORA Regulation M54/200843 applies to the priority rating of pub
tions networks and public authority ne
provided in these networks, and to redu
and securing power supply, and physical pr
 
47 http://www.ficora.fi/index/saadokset/maaraykset/teletoiminta.html. 
48 Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) M54/2008. 
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in section 8.3.1 (see also Appendix 2, section 3.1.3.1, not for publication, section 
.  
equipment 
ts for physical 
re that components of communications networks or 
 that unauthor-
 
Regulation M54/2008 also contains requirements on the protection of transmission 
system components. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24(1)(8-9) of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities)
 
Telecommunications companies must ensure that their premises for 
used for public telecommunications meet the minimum requiremen
protection. They must also ensu
services left outside the priority rating are protected physically such
ised persons cannot access them easily. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSED MEASURES 
 
9.1 Conclusions about current situation in general, and proposed measures 
 
9.1
egislation, stat-
y issues, and the 
a good standard 
d other standards are of a 
high standard. Interconnections function well and are simple. The Finnish Commu-
ents in the sec-
. 
he reciprocal ar-
y among the op-
ol) interconnec-
fiers is arranged 
 exercised. IP addresses 
net Registry (RIR) company 
(in Europe: RIPE NCC). The ‘fi’ root has been dispersed professionally. Within Fin-
re are three root name servers. For E.164 numbers (telephone 
 
.  
 
9.1
s operations and markets, especially telecommunications networks and 
t essential for 
echanisms 
Competition 
nd availability. 
The infrastructure network of cables (and radio frequencies) should be kept in good 
g network. Searches 
rformed on a con-
le.  
 
plications for operators in the sector. 
 
Telecommunications 
 
One of the objectives for traffic (operation) is that the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications and the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) 
should operate nationally and internationally in an active manner and with a strong 
mandate. This must be safeguarded at the CIIP level. 
 
No cost implications. 
 
 
 
 
 
.1 Telecommunications legislation, standards, structure, pricing 
 
In terms of usability and availability, Finland’s telecommunications l
ute monitoring, issuance of standards regarding information societ
structure, protection and operation of networks and services are of 
internationally. Specifications, security classifications an
nications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) actively monitors developm
tor and develops standards to meet changes occurring in the sector
 
Interconnections in the public telephone network are made under t
rangements of operators. IP interconnections are arranged centrall
erators in the sector. VoIP (Operational Voice over Internet Protoc
tion arrangements are still taking shape. Administration of identi
extremely well for those cases where national powers are
and route databases are produced by a Regional Inter
nish borders the
numbers), the mechanism is different and the national role greater.
 
The vulnerabilities of different networks are set out in Appendix 1
.1.1 Proposed measures 
 
ICT busines
services, should only be subject to guidance and control to the exten
ensuring diverse and sufficient markets and services. The guidance m
should comprise standards, operating licence conditions and funding. 
will increase the alternatives, also in regard to usability a
 
Infrastructure 
 
condition and should be a dense, flexible, up-to-date and evolvin
for and minimisation of single points of failure (SPOFs) should be pe
tinuous basis. The necessary equipment and power shall be availab
This has cost im
54 
 
End user 
 
At the user level, it is important to secure the operation of the term
ket, the operating system and system software markets, the encryp
market and the protective software market (anti-virus, IPS
inal device mar-
tion product 
 Attention must 
 emerge on the terminal de-
 markets and that there is no dependence on contact with a manu-
ces beyond the reach of government regulation. 
No cost implications. 
munications services in Finland should be at reasonable level 
or better. Has the often dramatic price competition of recent years been the reason 
why it has not proved possible to invest enough in service quality and accessibility 
eak coverage in mobile networks) or in development? This issue has been 
. Telecommuni-
ew of the Ministry 
of Transport and Communications and FICORA, and contingency preparations 
r the Ministry of Transport and Communications and the National 
ncy (sectors and pools). Depending on the case and the 
ay also be necessary to call for general views at the govern-
mmercial opera-
 further in-
nd in rectifying 
ove the usabil-
Enhancing usability and availability will require greater expertise and training. Main-
taining Finland’s critical information infrastructure and drafting procurement and 
operating agreements of a high standard will require a strengthening of national 
expertise in normal circumstances. Improving the level of expertise will also require 
additional investment in R&D projects in this field within the public sector as well as 
in the owner organisations and those organisations with specific responsibilities. 
There will be cost implications for different parties. It is not possible to estimate the 
scale of these. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
49, etc.).
be given to ensuring that high-risk combinations do not
vice or software
facture’s online servi
 
 
Pricing 
 
The pricing of telecom
(e.g. w
the subject of public debate. 
 
 
Ownership 
 
For the state, IT ownership should rest with the Ministry of Finance
cations matters, including the Internet, should be within the purvi
should be unde
Emergency Supply Age
situation at hand, it m
ment level.  In practice, the focus will be on the motivations of co
tors and on monitoring the outcome. 
 
No cost implications. 
 
Cooperation between parties 
 
Cooperation between operators (telecommunications, energy) must be
creased, especially in investigating network and service disruptions a
faults, as well as in planning contingency preparations. This will impr
ity and availability of services. 
 
 
 
49 IPS (Intrusion Prevention System). 
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9.1.2 Protection
 
 of information infrastructure 
9.1
lic authorities is-
unications, and VAHTI in respect of in-
regulations, as 
In addition, users have a wide range of practices for protecting themselves from, 
for encrypting data being transmitted or in files on their 
9.2
ral conclusions 
frastructure is, 
ministration, organisation, leg-
f information 
n service sectors 
and availability of information infrastructure is planned, imple-
technical solutions 
tructure cover 
rmal circum-
mmercial service-
public and pri-
 functions well and the division of costs is also well established. 
In addition to traditional telecommunications, information society networks include 
m various new sources too, such as the entertainment industry and pay-
to-access services. Guidance for these is based on different needs than for ICT 
e usability and 
 (quality clas-
9.2
9.2
 
As critical infrastructure, Finland’s fixed networks are of a high quality and the ac-
cessibility of online services is good. However, there is still considerable room for 
improvement in the fixed network in terms of future broadband needs, especially in 
sparsely populated areas. Certain preparations have already been made for this, as 
the Ministry of Transport and Communications already has broadband plans to build 
a fibre network by 2015 that would reach almost everyone. The practical guidelines 
for the programme are the responsibility of the Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority (FICORA).  
 
.2.1 Conclusions  
 
Information infrastructure is protected at a number of levels. Pub
sue regulations (e.g. FICORA in telecomm
formation security for the government), and industry has its own 
does the real estate sector (e.g. regarding cabling).  
 
for instance, malware and 
computers. 
 
 Critical communications systems 
 
9.2.1 Usability and availability of critical information infrastructure – gene
 
In the context of society’s vital functions in Finland,   
 ensuring the usability and availability of essential information in
for the most part, in good shape in terms of ad
islation and products/services.  
 There is room for improvement in the usability and availability o
systems and services. The information system and informatio
do not, however, feature comprehensive standards-based regulatory mecha-
nisms such as those in the electronic communications field. 
 The usability 
mented and managed as part of business processes. Purely 
and standards are not sufficient. 
 In Finland, the contingency preparations for information infras
not only emergency conditions but also disruptions under no
stances, through sectoral legislation and with the aid of co
level requirements. 
 The joint operation of contingency preparations between the 
vate sectors
 
traffic fro
functions (e.g. filtering, obligation to store).  As a consequence, th
availability requirements for networks and services can be conflicting
sification, pricing). 
 
.2 Fixed networks 
 
2.1 Conclusions .
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9.2.3 Mobile ne
 
tworks  
9.2
art of a high 
try, due to the 
rms of the accessibility of services, there is still room 
t, especially in regard to certain sparsely populated areas (but also 
 the Helsinki region).  
9.2
nications infra-
ng special measures should also be 
considered in regard to mobile networks: 
rivileged customer’ facility 
 a shared SIM facility (personal SIM card would work in any Finnish network 
that still operates after a user’s network crashes).   
Cost implications not assessed.  
9.2
9.2.4.1 Situation assessment and general measures50 
tial services for 
velopment over 
veryone needs the Internet for something, and society needs all 
tworks for something. 
 
esses and citi-
ernet located in 
 blocks of the 
ata transfer plat-
gulation and 
ate and reli-
 by taking into consideration that, for both trunk traffic and terminal devices, 
 single, sufficiently meshed 
communications infrastructure which, unseen to users, utilises a different pro-
tocol or different networks for data transmission 
the Internet is secured 
 d active role in the international 
administration and development of the Internet (Internet Cooperation for As-
signed Names and Numbers (ICANN)) 
 by launching separate reporting on protection of the Internet.  
 
The public sector must reserve sufficient resources for these tasks. 
 
 
                                                
.3.1 Conclusions 
 
As critical infrastructure, Finland’s mobile networks are for the most p
quality, and accessibility is moderate or better throughout the coun
competitive environment. In te
for improvemen
in certain parts of
 
.3.2 Proposed measures 
 
In addition to the general contingency preparations for telecommu
structure in emergency conditions, the followi
 introduction of a ‘p

 
 
.4 Internet 
 
 
It is not possible to give a detailed list or to know of all the essen
society over a time perspective covering many years (compare de
past 15 years).  E
services and ne
The Internet has become a critical infrastructure. Services for busin
zens via the Internet have become vital. The elements of the Int
Finland and the services available in Finland are among the building
country’s social fabric.   
 
9.2.4.2 Proposed measures 
 
The functioning of the Internet as a neutral, evolving and critical d
form must be secured with the aid of international collaboration, re
technical solutions, to ensure that it serves society at large in an adequ
able manner, as follows: 
the different networks should link together into a
 by ensuring that communications secrecy on 
 by ensuring that Finland has a continuing an
 
50 Seminar on the YKÄ project, 15 April 2009. Internet working group conclusions. 
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9.2.4.3
Table 9.1 gives examples of threat scenarios that can appear on the Internet and 
tions responsible.  
 
Tabl ternet t  ta m. 
 Risks and development opportunities 
 
how these can be tackled fully or partially, and the organisa
e 9.1 In hreat scenarios and means for ckling and preventing the
 
Threat Means for tackling/preventing Organisations responsible 
International d
operational (da
 Fin and, and  
n national (information) 
 
in coop
 CERT-FI 
 operators 
 FICIX 
 
atabases or 
ta) security 
 services emulated in
 either ow
systems could fail s
l
ecurity systems c
 national bac
reated, or
k-up systems cre-
ated eration with organi-
sations in the sector. 
Internet DNS serv
could be falsified en
masse
er data introduce a DNSSEC sy
 
t, or en
 
 operators 
 Finnish Communications Regula-
tory Authority (FICORA) 
ire servers 
cal points as applicab
 ENUM51 (or DNSxxx) 
falsified. 
stem for criti-
le, and 
 FICIX 
IP addresses registered in  establish a national w
Finland could be hijacked 
either intentionally or unin-
and  
 agree via EU cooperatio
tentionally. minimisation in the ev
materialising 
ar ing system, 
pact 
eat 
 CERT-FI 
 Ministry of Transport and Commu-
nications (MTC) 
n
n on im
ent of a thr
Other measures for improving the Internet’s usability, avail-
ability, reliability and international accessibility 
 
Clocking of new telecommunications networks, and NT
Time Protocol) distribution (caesium or G
P (Network  FICIX 
PS clock). 
Guidance on telecommunications companies’ use of r
and consideration of a RouteServer option for inte
oute reflectors, 
. 
 FICORA 
 operators rconnections
Securing Finnish representation and continuum in global Internet 
administration (ICANN52, IGF53 and IANA54). 
 MTC/FICORA 
 Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
The United States is preparing legislation on cyber security. It looks 
Internet connection of any organisation or service55.  
 Legislative developments must be 
itored at both national and EU 
level 
 
like the US President may not, after all, be given the right to cut the mon
The first draft of the law indicated that the President would be able 
to disconnect any information system or network critical for the 
Federal Government or the United States. 
 MTC 
 MFA
 
 
Contingency preparations for disruptive situations under normal circumstances 
 
In normal circumstances there are various disruptive situations that could emerge 
on the Internet and for which it must be possible to make contingency prepara-
tions. These are presented in Table 9.2. Finland could, for example, be the target of 
a very serious 
isruption (e.g. a 
                                                
a disruption from outside its borders (e.g. a DDoS56 attack). This is 
threat scenario. Finland could also be a base for the launch of a d
DDoS attack or an IP hijack).  
 
 
 
 
51 ENUM (from E.164 NUmber Mapping). ENUM is a technology, in which ENUM identifers based on the Internet’s 
DNS server system are formed from traditional telephone numbers (on the E.164 standard). This allows a variety 
of communications services to be directed to the number (such as Internet phone calls and e-mail). Although 
ENUM supports various services such as instant messaging and e-mail, its most important use is in directing VoIP 
calls (http://www.ficora.fi/index/palvelut/palvelutaiheittain/enum/mikaenumon.html). 
52 ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers). See Appendix 2. 
53 IGF (Internet Governance Forum). See Appendix 2 
54 IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority). See Appendix 2. 
55 TIVI.fi, 1 September 2009. http://www.tietoviikko.fi/kaikki_uutiset/article323975.ece?s=l&wtm=tietoviikko/-
01092009. 
56 DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service). A simultaneous attack from several sources against a certain system. 
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Table 9.2 Contingency preparations for disruptive situations on the Internet under normal 
circumstances. 
 
Disruptive situation  Means for tackling/preventing Organisations responsible 
Cooperation among tele-
ions compa-
 Securing emergency fu
 Takcommunicat
nies paralyzed (e.g. result 
ing over a compa
activities  
o-
mergency Supply 
nd Com-
munications (MTC) 
 Finnish Communications Regula-
tory Authority (FICORA) 
of corporate acquisition).  Arranging operations th
nding   National E
ny’s operating Agency 
 Ministry of Transport a
rough temp
rary solutions. 
Finland could, 
be the target o
tion from outside i
rence to traffic that is 
y, e.g.  
-listed mail 
vi-
dardised nationally. 
 MTC 
 FICORA 
 Operators 
 
for example,  By giving prefe
f a disrup-
ts bor-
internal to the countr
 by introducing white
ders (e.g. a DDoS attack). servers, DNS servers
leged customer’ facil
 and a ‘pri
ity.  
stomer’ facility  The ‘privileged cu
should be stan
Finland could also be a 
base for the launch of an 
uption 
ck or an 
ck), in which case 
the threat could be that 
olated from 
, and 
y even a shut-
onal infra-
 Aim to avoid directing society’s protec-
tive actions (filtering, telesurveillance) 
at critical elements.  
 Protective actions should be imple-
mented separately from them. 
 MTC 
 FICORA 
 Operators international disr
(e.g. a DDoS atta
IP hija
 Finland is is
other countries
 possibl
down of nati
structure. 
 
.5 Broadband quality 
 
.5.1 Conclusions 
 
9.2
9.2
Finland’s broadband quality (broadband quality score (BQS)) has in recent years 
slipped behind the broadband services offered by other developed countries.  This 
is illustrated by the results of an extensive survey shown in Figure 9.1. The BQS 
measures both the downlink and uplink speeds and the latency (delay) weighted by 
different traffic profiles, both currently and also in accordance with application sce-
narios for the future. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Broadband quality score (BQS) in different countries.57 
 
                                                 
57 Broadband Quality Score – A global study of broadband quality, September 2008 (sponsored by Cisco). 
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The BQS correlates with the pervasiveness of ICT products and serv
edge economy and Internet use. The density of the fibre network
ices, the knowl-
 and the extent to 
 BQS score. 
The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) has published a new 
 on the quality of communications networks and services. 
9.2.5.2
ngs on account 
ise, and to en-
land should in-
sing on quality. At 
ent in fibre connections. 
 
n of information society 
Ä objectives. The achievement of 
d strategy. 
stment. 
9.2.6 General contingency preparations for emergency conditions 
An emergency situation affecting ICT services may arise for instance from a major 
n or the reali of a serious e n such circum-
stances, the accessibility of telecommunications serv  be diminished in 
g for emerg
which cable networks have been updated are also factors raising the
 
Regulation M58
 
 Proposed measures 
 
Investment in fibre infrastructure 
 
If Finland’s information society is to return to the level where it belo
of the experience gained and the economic and technological expert
sure greater trust in the Internet’s role as critical infrastructure, Fin
vest further in broadband access, increasing penetration and focu
the infrastructure level this means greater investm
Improved broadband access will promote the wider adoptio
technologies, and this will be in line with the YK
this will be furthered by the Government’s broadban
 
The cost implications are great and focus mainly on network inve
 
 
market disruptio sation xternal threat. I
ices could
part or in full
 
Table 9.3 Contin
 (see Table 9.3). 
e cy preparations n ency conditions. 
 
Emergency condi-
tions 
Action Organisations re-
sponsible 
Cooperation among 
telecommunications 
companies could be 
 Agreeing a takeover of the o ions of 
telecommunications companies by the 
government or some other party agreed 
e government. 
 Ministry of Finance 
(MF) 
 Ministry of Transport 
and Communications 
(MTC) 
paralyzed as a result of 
market disruptions 
by th
 
 bankruptcies 
 lack of attention to 
resources.  
perat
Telecommunications 
companies’ operations 
 Transfer to official systems.  
 
 MF
could become paralyzed 
 
 MTC 
 e.g. military strikes. 
 
9.2.7 Other general challenges and measures 
 
9.2.7.1 Emergency powers legislation – guidance for contingency preparations 
 
Should emergency powers be invoked already during major disasters rather than 
only in emergency conditions (see 7.2)? 
 
 
9.2.7.2 Adapting services in line with developments at EU level 
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Attention must be paid to ensuring that the development of service 
level and the measures to secure vital functions domestically are in h
each other and mutually compatible. One example is the way in w
system has developed in the financial sector; another is the develo
structures among different operators (e.g. ene
structures at EU 
armony with 
hich the payment 
pment of shared 
rgy, telecommunications).  Further 
good solutions from Finland to the 
utions from the EU.  
9.2
y the private 
partners of service providers can be managed through 
changes occur-
ring in these relationships, and the responsibilities involved are the most challeng-
ing to manage and supervise.  
9.2  business inter-
est
The information society has numerous joint projects in which political decision-
projects have 
e aim of nu-
isting e-identification systems become a new threat to the continuity of 
-sized companies even have the resources to main-
tain and manage countless parallel identification technologies and information secu-
Collaboration between the different parties must be strengthened and the needs 
decisions and 
9.3 p policy and industrial policy 
 
9.3
ickly become the most strategic critical infrastruc-
nally in all areas 
nstance in regard 
Finland is among the world’s safest countries. It is not subject to any immediate 
threat of a conflict. The world is shrinking, however. Globalisation, economic swings 
and future threat scenarios involving networks have led to attempts to use national 
resources to ensure critical ICT functions.  
 
As a consequence of international cooperation, new operating models have been 
formed from complex value networks. An organisation’s operating processes may 
be partially or wholly located outside the country’s borders, making it more difficult 
to control the security and reliability of operations. 
 
 
 
 
development should be facilitated by exporting 
EU, in addition to Finland adopting sol
 
.7.3 Manageability of networked business activities 
 
Almost all service provision in an information society is managed b
sector. The immediate 
agreements. Service structures relying on chains of relationships, 
  
.7.4 Collaboration between political decision-making, bill drafting and
s 
 
making, bill drafting and business interests are represented. These 
not always produced the best possible results. For example, could th
merous coex
service provision? See sections 6.3 and 9.6.  
 
Moreover, do small and medium
rity technologies? 
 
and opportunities of users (companies, consumers) to benefit from 
solutions should be investigated further. 
 
Issues of ownershi 
.1 Changing situation – growing challenges 
 
Information infrastructure has qu
ture, together with energy supply. This is acknowledged internatio
of society, and applies as much to volumes as to significance, for i
to productivity in society.  
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9.3.2
 globalisation 
of supply and the outsourcing of functions, possible side-effects of which could 
f ICT services.  
 in the protection 
ety’s contingency 
n.  
anteed in all cases, 
high proportion 
services or go bankrupt.  
 
petitive environment leaves few spare resources for a company, 
company’s op-
 group’s findings 
 
ownership and 
. 
9.3
ccessibility of 
a leaks and de-
 assets were 
 of information infrastructure critical to the function-
ing of society must be arranged in such a way that influence can be brought to bear 
ecisions. 
ust help establish a protection body for critical information infrastructure 
 for private op-
uired for contin-
9.3 ency Supply Organisation 
 
9.3
ximately EUR 
ials. The largest 
cy’s assets. Other 
major product groups are grain and seed grain, medication materials and various 
 
 
Security of supply in regard to the functioning of the information society is coordi-
nated by the National Emergency Supply Agency’s infrastructure department, in-
formation society cluster and the pools within it. In addition, the information society 
cluster has its own regional organisation, a regional pool consisting of ‘TIVA’ com-
mittees concerned with contingency preparations for information systems. The 
                                                
 Threat: market disruptions 
 
A characteristic of recent developments in ICT services has been the
cause serious market disruptions and problems for the accessibility o
 
The market does not always encourage private operators to invest
of critical information infrastructure to a standard required for soci
preparations.  This was also concluded by the European Commissio
 
The usability and availability of ICT services cannot be guar
and this will affect society’s contingency preparations. An ICT company and a criti-
cal subcontractor company serving it could, for instance, dismiss a 
of their staff resources, discontinue offering certain 
Today’s tough com
and this could weaken its risk-bearing capacity and thus make the 
erations more vulnerable to various threats in a crisis situation.  
 
9.3.3 Working
There was lively discussion in the working group on the subjects of 
supervision of critical information infrastructure and its components
 
.3.1 Measures 
 
The securing of information assets and data vital to society, and the a
these, must be guaranteed in all security situations. To prevent dat
nial-of-service attacks, for example, it would be good if information
widely dispersed. Management
through national statutes and d
 
Society m
for situations in which the market does not offer sufficient incentive
erators to invest in protecting such infrastructure to a standard req
gency preparation in society at large.    
 
.4 National Emerg
.4.1 Background 
 
The National Emergency Supply Agency’s balance sheet shows appro
1.2 billion58. Most of the funds are committed to warehouse mater
product group by far is liquid fuels, comprising 80% of the Agen
industrial materials. 
 
58 http://www.huoltovarmuus.fi/organisaatio/talous-ja-lainsaadanto/huoltovarmuuden-rahoitus/. 
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Agency’s information society cluster is of strategic importance from the YKÄ per-
ogistics have a 
 strategic role. Furthermore, the role of the information society in ensuring 
 normal circumstances has expanded and is of growing 
9.3 up 
 
Emergency Supply Organisation should be further strength-
  
s not assessed. 
 
9.3
9.3
nd the normal 
technologies will 
 work on critical 
astructure protection (CIIP) will also require additional investment. 
g that it is 
t necessarily provide sufficient incen-
ociety’s contin-
 budget, in which the government’s share is e.g. 50% and that 
of telecommunications companies altogether 50%. 
 buyers and 
In both models telecommunications companies are set obligations and principles 
ents in CIIP in 
 is the same as 
rgy taxes. The 
are allocated to 
CT structures. 
 
A further question surrounds the role of networks and service providers that are 
important to society (mass media, funding, retail,...) in the collection of CIIP fund-
 
The turnover of telecommunications companies in 2008, for example, was a total of 
EUR 4,262.6 million59. If 0.6% of this were collected for contingency preparations, 
this would mean an additional sum of about EUR 25 million on the present contin-
gency preparation budget.  
 
                                                
spective. 
 
In regard to maintaining the security of supply, ICT activities and l
growing
vital functions of society in
significance. 
 
.4.2 Proposal of the working gro
The role of the National 
ened and expanded in regard to ICT.
 
Cost implication
.5 Expansion of budget for security of supply 
 
.5.1 Problem and models 
 
Securing critical information infrastructure for vital systems beyo
level in order to facilitate the wider adoption of information society 
require additional investment from ICT operators. Developing the
information infr
 
In April 2009, the European Commission issued a commentary statin
commonly perceived that market forces do no
tive for private operators to invest in CIIP to a level required for s
gency preparations.  
 
There are two main alternatives regarding CIIP funding: 
 a separate CIIP
 telecommunications companies collect ‘CIIP cents’ directly from
transfer these to the CIIP budget.  
 
concerning who pays if it becomes necessary to make key investm
excess of the normal level. 
 
The first of the two models is in use in Sweden. The second principle
today’s ‘emergency supply charge’ collected in conjunction with ene
emergency supply fund is growing through energy use, but funds 
e.g. medicines and I
ing and in paying for investments. 
 
59 http://www.stat.fi/til/tvie/2008/tvie_2008_2009-06-09_tau_011_fi.html. 
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The level of funding should be adjusted to meet overall demand, an
geted in accordan
d should be tar-
ce with the needs of critical infrastructure, as outlined in the Gov-
s in themselves guarantee companies an 
nuity management. If needs are greater than this, public 
ugh budget funds.  
9.3  group’s findings 
 
d funding of the new challenges for contingency 
9.4
9.4
y and availabil-
ctions of society 
inistries and or-
anisations, and to a range of projects. Within the framework of the YKÄ project 
nior level in 
nds continuity 
 the prac-
group found 
the YKÄ objectives, as all the required action must 
nsure that unde-
 the strategy and guidelines of the YKÄ project should be controlled and moni-
ccount of the intricacies involved, but implementation of 
d CIIP dimen-
equire continu-
ll-justified rationale set out by the public sector.  
 
9.4
 
rtant to further develop the work of the YKÄ 
project and to consider the forms that this could take. It is proposed that the own-
 should lie with the National Emergency Supply Or-
n’s information society cluster. The preparatory work should also include 
ties in the YKÄ field.  
 
Sufficient resources must be allocated for developing the YKÄ project. 
 
 
9.5 Measures related to services and technology 
 
9.5.1 Establishing a disruptive events register 
 
9.5.1.1 Background 
 
ernment decision. 
 
Demand and supply should nevertheles
appropriate level of conti
authorities would pay this thro
 
.5.2 Working
The working group has discusse
preparations.  
 
 Further development of the YKÄ work 
 
.1 Guaranteeing the continuity of the YKÄ process 
 
Responsibilities in regard to the YKÄ work on enhancing the usabilit
ity of information infrastructure essential for securing the vital fun
are currently allocated within the public sector to the different m
g
now being concluded, the future of this work is being examined at se
the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The YKÄ work dema
and needs to be further developed in regard to business processes and
tices agreed on the basis of these (see section 6.2.4). The working 
that 
 there are no shortcuts to 
be taken with care 
 the YKÄ project should be guided and monitored actively to e
sirable practices do not get established unintentionally 
tored centrally on a
the measures would be dispersed. 
 
An important element of the YKÄ project is the international CII an
sion, mainly associated with the European Union. These activities r
ous monitoring and a we
.1.1 Proposals of the working group 
The working group feels that it is impo
ership of this preparatory work
ganisatio
R&D activi
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rely especially 
 sought to model 
udies are mainly theoretical and, al-
most without exception, lack real practical data. A register of disruptive events is 
e 
ccurring its own field, rated in an agreed manner, and figures would then 
an automatic basis in a manner determined on the basis of 
modelling. 
nts (e.g. ICT, energy)  
ponent identification  
vents, and the 
 second and third 
 
tion of ICT resources and organisation for usability and 
availability/contingency preparations 
9.5
 
tion should be made concerning the establishment of a disrup-
 The owner of the project would be the Na-
upply Organisation/information society cluster. 
 
9.6
9.6.1 Identity management 
The value and verification of identities should constitute a critical infrastructure of 
nion. 
ed iden-
tity recognition procedure in use within the information society. 
 
9.6.1.1 Proposals of the working group 
 
The working group proposes that identity management should form a separate con-
cept in the field of critical infrastructure. To develop this concept further, attention 
should be focused on whether it can be linked up as part of some existing and suffi-
ciently broad identity management development project.  
 
The public sector must reserve sufficient resources for this. 
Critical infrastructures (CIs) are interdependent in many ways, and 
on ICT and energy supply. A number of international studies have
these interdependencies.  However, these st
needed that would be based on practical observations.  
 
Such a register could operate by, for example, each CI sector listing the disruptiv
events o
compiled centrally on 
 
The register could be used in 
 
1. identifying critical CI compone
a) critical com
b) investigating the real origin and importance of disruptive e
cascading of disruptions from one CI to a
c) modelling and forecasting.  
2. developing quality  
a) planning and alloca
b) supervision of ICT system service level agreements  
c) formulation of a status report (e.g. energy, ICT).  
 
.1.2 Proposals of the working group 
A separate investiga
tive events register as described above.
tional Emergency S
 
The estimated cost of the project is EUR 400,000 annually. 
 Other proposed measures 
 
 
its own. This should also be raised to the CII level in the European U
 
There must be a functioning, reliable, simple and sufficiently widely accept
 
